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RECONCEIVING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
Elizabeth Pollman* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC1 put in sharp 
relief the public’s concern about the scope of corporate constitutional rights and 
the disconnect between protecting corporations and protecting people. Few 
decisions have been the subject of such immediate and widespread public 
disapproval. Subsequently, commentators and scholars have treated the First 
Amendment speech2 and campaign finance3 aspects of the case extensively, and 
others have addressed related concerns regarding corporate governance,4 corporate 
criminal liability, 5  and various other matters. 6  This Article breaks from those 
approaches. It does not focus primarily on Citizens United. Instead, this Article 
examines the origins of corporations as right holders—the doctrine of corporate 
* © 2011 Elizabeth Pollman, Law Fellow, Stanford Law School, Rock Center for
Corporate Governance, Stanford University. My sincere thanks to Michael Klausner, 
Richard Craswell, Norman Spaulding, Larry Ribstein, Jordan Barry, Peter Conti-Brown, 
Peter Linzer, Gowri Ramachandran, Ryan Calo, Samuel Bray, Nick Stephanopoulos, 
Jeanne Merino, Deepa Varadarajan, Andrea Roth, Shirin Sinnar, and participants at fellows 
workshops at Stanford Law School for helpful suggestions and comments. 
1 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
2 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 
(2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
143 (2010); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011); 
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens 
United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010). 
3 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 118 (2010); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
4 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 999; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political 
Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not 
United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009).
5 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing 
Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1 (2010). 
6  See, e.g., Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live 
Together?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (2010); Adam Liptak, Caperton After Citizens United, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (2010); Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and 
the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663 (2011); Paul M. Secunda, 
Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in the Post-Citizens United 
Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2010). 
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personhood—and offers an alternative approach to determining the scope of 
corporate rights. 
Specifically, this Article traces historical and theoretical developments in the 
corporation and corporate personhood jurisprudence to show that the roots of the 
doctrine are based in concerns about the property and contract interests of 
shareholders. Over time, however, the Court expanded the doctrine without a 
coherent explanation or consistent approach. It recognized corporations as subject 
to criminal liability and expanded the scope of corporate rights to include a 
patchwork of rights related to searches and trials. And, the Court recognized 
corporations as having commercial and political speech rights. 
But the conceptions of the corporation the Court has used in its ad hoc 
dispensation of rights are substantively flawed and incomplete. Moreover, 
oscillating between these conceptions demonstrates the weakness of this approach. 
Viewing the corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of a time before 
incorporating became a mere administrative formality. Likewise, viewing the 
corporation as just an aggregate of its shareholders can be incongruent with 
modern times, particularly in the large public company context. Shareholders in 
publicly traded corporations are not a static set of identifiable human actors and 
they do not control day-to-day corporate decision-making. Conceiving of the 
corporation as a real entity, more than a legal fiction or the sum of its shareholders, 
does not explain why corporations would receive constitutional protections as 
people. 
Taking account of the doctrine’s roots and its expansions, this Article argues 
that corporate personhood should be understood as merely recognizing the 
corporation’s ability to hold rights in order to protect the people involved.7 This 
concept is the only common thread in the case law. But that concept alone does not 
speak to whether corporations should have a particular right; it only provides a 
7  For different arguments about corporate personhood jurisprudence and its 
implications, see HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION viii  (1995)  (arguing that the proper application  of the Constitution to the  
corporation is as a set of private contractual relationships and that “[a]cceptance of this 
analysis should lead to broader constitutional protection” for the corporation); THOM 
HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THE 
THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) (a progressive, historical perspective arguing that 
corporations have been trying to “steal” rights through corporate personhood and dominate 
our democracy, and proposing legal reform such as constitutional amendment); Carl J. 
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS 
L.J. 577 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court lacks a defensible theory for corporate 
personhood and proposing a constitutional amendment establishing a presumption favoring 
the individual over the corporation); Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A 
Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 97 (2009) (arguing for an interdisciplinary view of corporations); Dale Rubin, 
Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant 
Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523 
(2010) (arguing that Bill of Rights protections were created only for individuals and not for 
corporations).
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starting point of analysis—the notion that it is possible for corporations to hold 
rights. Furthermore, a metaphor or philosophical conception of the corporation is 
not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the Court should conduct. The 
Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional right at issue, and whether 
it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corporation—and 
thereby to the people underlying the corporation. 
In contrast to the Court’s ad hoc approach to corporate rights, this Article’s 
alternative approach would offer the advantage of increased judicial legitimacy and 
transparency. This approach would use a coherent test consistent with the 
objectives of the underlying rights as well as the realities and dynamics of the 
modern business corporation. It does not provide a grand theory of constitutional 
interpretation nor does it prescribe a particular theory of the corporation. Rather, it 
more modestly asserts that the Court should similarly approach questions of 
corporate rights, cognizant of the pragmatic assertion of American philosopher 
John Dewey that the facts and relations involved should be faced and stated in the 
process.8 
This Article begins by examining the development of corporations and 
corporate personhood theories in early America and the nineteenth century. This 
historical and theoretical background provides critical insight into the narrow 
property and contract context in which the Court first established its view of the 
corporation as a person for constitutional purposes. Part III then shows how the 
Court continued to rely on the corporate-person metaphor in expanding corporate 
liability and rights beyond the doctrine’s roots without regard to the limited 
explanatory power of the earlier jurisprudence or the changed nature of the modern 
business corporation. Part IV explains the limitations of the Court’s conceptions of 
the corporation in this jurisprudence. Having established the roots of the doctrine 
and its ungrounded expansions, Part V critically examines substitutes for the 
corporate-person metaphor and suggests an alternative approach to determining the 
scope of corporate rights. 
 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 
GROUNDED IN PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS’ PROPERTY AND CONTRACT INTERESTS 
 
This section examines the development of corporations and corporate 
personhood in early America and the nineteenth century to introduce the context in 
which the Court first established its view of the corporation as a person for 
constitutional purposes. This shows the limited purview of the corporate 
personhood doctrine and its grounding in protecting individuals’ property and 
contract interests. 
It should be noted at the outset, however, that we did not create the corporate 
form or the corporate-person metaphor; we inherited and transformed them. Some 
trace the origins of the corporate form to ancient Rome, and more definitively, to 
                                                 
8 John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE 
L.J. 655, 672–73 (1926). 
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medieval Europe when churches, guilds, and local governments sought royal 
authority to incorporate entities for perpetual survival. 9  By the late sixteenth 
century, several European countries had begun chartering corporations to develop 
foreign trade and colonies.10 Some of these early corporations, such as the East 
India Company and the Hudson Bay Company, became well-known players in 
American colonial times.11 English law used the metaphor of the corporation as a 
person to describe the self-perpetuating nature of the corporation.12 
 
A.  The Corporation in Early America 
 
Although corporations were known in American colonial times, the 
Constitution itself includes no specific reference to corporations. 13  Corporate 
history in early America remains somewhat murky and subject to debate. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United illustrates this with Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’ dissent presenting opposing views about 
whether the Framers disliked corporations, and more fundamentally, about the 
perceived role of corporations during this period.14 
                                                 
9 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 1–3 (1970); David F. Linowes, The 
Corporation as Citizen, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 345 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1992). 
10 See HURST, supra note 9, at 4. 
11 See id. at 7; Linowes, supra note 9, at 345. 
12 For example, Blackstone noted that when members “are consolidated and united 
into a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one person in law: as 
one person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the 
individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to the 
present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never 
dies . . . .” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 468 (7th ed. 1775). 
13 HURST, supra note 9, at 113–15. 
14  See 130 S. Ct. 876, 925–29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. id. at 929–79 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). On re-argument, the case concerned the constitutionality of 
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting 
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures 
advocating for or against candidates in certain federal elections within a certain number of 
days of those elections. Id. at 887. Justice Stevens dissented on multiple grounds, including 
on the basis that the majority opinion overruled cases that were not inconsistent with “our 
First Amendment tradition” and “original understandings . . . .” Id. at 948. Relying on 
sources by historians and legal academics, Justice Stevens argued that the Framers 
“conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it,” and understood corporations 
as being subject to “comprehensive[] regulat[ion] in the service of public welfare.” Id. at 
948–50. Justice Scalia concurred separately to respond to the dissent, and argued that the 
“text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker” and that “the dissent offers 
no evidence about the original meaning of the text to support any such exclusion.” Id. at 
929. Specifically, Justice Scalia asserted that although the number of corporations in 
America by the end of the eighteenth century seems small, the corporation was “a familiar 
figure in American economic life” and it is unclear that corporations were “despised” and 
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Notwithstanding some debate about the role and view of corporations in early 
America, scholars agree that before independence there were only a small handful 
of corporations. 15  Most businesses were organized as sole proprietorships and 
partnerships rather than as corporations.16 After independence, royal charter was 
no longer required for incorporation; that authority subsequently resided in each 
state.17 By the end of the eighteenth century, the number of corporations increased 
to around 300. 18  As discussed further below, the great majority of these 
corporations engaged in quasi-public activities such as infrastructure building, 
while only a small fraction engaged in general commerce. 19  The corporate 
landscape therefore looked much different from today’s. 
 
B.  The Corporation as a Special Privilege or Concession of the State 
 
By the early part of the nineteenth century, although the number had increased 
since independence, there were still relatively few corporations.20 State legislatures 
controlled the authority for businesses to incorporate and before the 1850s, 
typically granted charters only by special order on an individual basis. 21 
                                                 
that even if they were that the Framers would have excluded them from the First 
Amendment. Id. at 925–26. Justice Scalia purported to show that the “lack of a textual 
exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such 
organizations did not exist or did not speak” with examples of political speech by a 
religious corporation and two political advocacy corporations. Id. at 926–27. He did not 
provide any examples of early corporate political expenditures by business corporations. 
15 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188–89 (2d ed. 1985); 
HURST, supra note 9, at 7, 14. 
16 See Linowes, supra note 9, at 346 (explaining that “[m]erchants at that time had 
limited need for the advantages of incorporation, preferring more immediate and exclusive 
control of their businesses”); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1 (1986); 
Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 414 (2003). 
17 Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an 
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 404 (1982). 
18 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 188–89 (“In all of the 18th century, charters were 
issued to only 335 businesses. Only seven of these were during the colonial period; 181 
were issued between 1796 and 1800.”); HURST, supra note 9, at 14 (“After independence 
the desire of businessmen to use the corporation mounted rapidly; state legislatures 
chartered 317 business corporations from 1780 to 1801.”). 
19 HURST, supra note 9, at 17 (“Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted 
from 1780 to 1801 in the states . . . less than 4 per cent were for general business 
corporations.”); Brickey, supra note 17, at 404 (“Of the 225 private corporate charters 
granted prior to 1800, fewer than a third were issued to enterprises whose purpose was to 
engage in general commercial activity.”). 
20 See Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller, Introduction to CORPORATIONS AND 
SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 2 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 
1987) (“Only approximately 300 corporations, each comparatively small in size, were 
present as late as 1800.”). 
21 See HURST, supra note 9, at 15; see also Linowes, supra note 9, at 346. 
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Corporations were generally viewed as enterprises owing their existence to the 
state because their authority to conduct business in corporate form flowed from a 
state-granted charter.22 
As a special government “privilege” or “grant,” states mainly awarded 
charters for enterprises that would benefit the public good, such as for building 
public works like bridges and supplying public transport like operating a ferry.23 In 
this sense, most corporations were “quasi-public.” 24  The corporate form was 
particularly well suited to developing these capital-intensive, large-scale 
businesses.25 By incorporating, companies could obtain large amounts of capital 
while limiting investors’ participation in management. 26  And unlike a sole 
proprietorship or a partnership, shareholders of a corporation have limited liability 
for the corporation’s debts—meaning that their losses cannot exceed the amount 
they paid for their shares.27 
                                                 
22 HURST, supra note 9, at 17; see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (discussed infra notes 34–42). 
23 See HURST, supra note 9, at 15, 17; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72–73 (1992). 
24 Blair, supra note 16, at 428. Blair explained: 
 
The distinction between these early civic, religious, and charitable 
corporations and some of the earliest business corporations may not have been 
obvious. . . . Both types were also intended to serve a broad, quasi-public 
purpose. . . . In fact, many of these businesses might more appropriately be 
regarded as public works projects, which the states did not want to have to use 
their taxing authority to finance. Often they were highly risky enterprises, which 
not infrequently failed to earn any profits at all. And even when the businesses 
were able to earn a profit, it was not uncommon that the assets of the business, 
including the special franchise they had, would revert to the government after 
some specified period of time. 
 
Id. 
25 Id. at 427–28; see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the 
Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture, 
in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 29 (Kenneth 
Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004) (“There is general consensus that, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, corporations were critical to the task of mobilizing capital for large-
scale industry.”). 
26 See Blair, supra note 16, at 393. 
27  In the nineteenth century, there was some variation as limited liability gained 
acceptance. CLARK, supra note 16, at 7; see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE 
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW 
CORPORATE PERSONALITY 3–20 (1993) (discussing general American acceptance of 
limited liability by early nineteenth century but noting that some states allowed for liability 
up to double or triple the original capital subscription); HURST, supra note 9, at 27–28 
(noting a presumption of corporate limited liability existed until the middle to late part of 
the nineteenth century when statutes clarified this status). 
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In addition to requiring a special charter, states also subjected corporations to 
various limitations, such as on the number of shareholders, capitalization, and life 
term.28 Further, special charters and early legislation required that the corporate 
charters define a limiting purpose or field of operation for the business.29 Early 
case law, known as the “ultra vires” doctrine, held corporations to actions inside 
these formal, delineated corporate powers and imposed consequences on actions 
outside of these powers.30 Thus, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century, corporations were organized with a quasi-public function and were 
understood to be subject to strict government limitations.31 
This view of corporations, as creatures of the state, artificial beings having 
only those rights explicitly granted to them, is often called the “concession” 
theory.32 Under this view the corporation is a legal fiction and incorporation a 
special privilege or concession awarded by the state. Accordingly, this view 
supported the government-imposed limitations on corporations of the time because 
if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that it can be a limited one. 
In many respects, the Court developed its personification of the corporation 
during this early period of corporate development. The context for these cases 
involved questions of property and contract. The well-known case, Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,33 illustrates how the concession theory animated 
the Supreme Court’s early view of the corporation and its early jurisprudence using 
the person metaphor to protect property and contract interests.34 
In Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court held that the state could not 
unilaterally amend the charter of a private college and effectively convert it into a 
public institution.35 Viewing the corporate charter as a contract with the state, the 
                                                 
28 See HURST, supra note 9, at 45–47, 157. 
29 Id. at 44. 
30 Id. at 157. For a discussion of the rise and fall of the ultra vires doctrine, see Kent 
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes 
on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 
1302–13 (2001). 
31 HURST, supra note 9, at 17; see also Samuel Williston, History of the Law of 
Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 110 (1888) (“But the 
corporation was far from being regarded as simply an organization for the more convenient 
prosecution of business. It was looked on as a public agency . . . .”). 
32 This notion also goes by the name of variant theories like the artificial entity, 
creature, grant, or fiction theory. See Dewey, supra note 8, at 665–68 (explaining some of 
the finer intricacies of these theories and noting differences between ones often lumped 
together such as the fiction theory and concession theory). 
33 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
34 See id. at 636–39. Dartmouth College did not involve a business corporation, but 
commentators have noted its primary significance is with regard to business corporations. 
HURST, supra note 9, at 63; WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 113–14 (10th ed. 2007); 
Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 
2621 n.175 (2008). 
35 17 U.S. at 650. 
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Court struck down a statute attempting to change the charter as a violation of the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which forbids a state from passing a bill 
impairing a contractual obligation.36 
The Court first drew a distinction between a state legislature’s ability to act 
with regard to a public versus a private entity, emphasizing that Dartmouth College 
was private because its funds derived from private donations and neither its 
educational activities nor its incorporation changed its private character. 37 
According to the Court, a corporation has only the attributes that its charter 
bestows upon it. In this case the corporation was chartered for private purposes, 
and would be protected as a private contract.38 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall famously explained that a 
corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.”39 As “the mere creature of law,” the corporation has only 
the properties conferred by its charter, including “immortality” and 
“individuality.” 40  Incorporation does not change the private nature of the 
business.41 The corporation represents the aims of the people who created it by 
state charter. The decision thus recognized the corporation itself as “an artificial 
being” having constitutional rights to protect the property interests of its individual 
donors.42 
Twenty years after this application of the Contracts Clause, the Supreme 
Court declared that a corporation is not a “citizen” within the meaning of the 
Constitution’s Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause in Bank of Augusta v. 
                                                 
36 Id. at 624–50. For later Contracts Clause cases, see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
37 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 629–39. 
38 Id. at 636–39. States responded to Dartmouth College by reserving authority in the 
state legislature to amend, change, or repeal charters it granted. HURST, supra note 9, at 63. 
39 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636. Chief Justice Marshall imported from Lord 
Coke the idea of a corporation as “invisible, immortal, and rest[ing] only in intendment and 
consideration of the law,” Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (1612), and from 
Blackstone the idea of the corporation as an “artificial person,” BLACKSTONE, supra note 
12, at 467–68. See also BLUMBERG, supra note 27, at 4–5, 7 (discussing how Chief Justice 
Marshall borrowed from English characterizations of the corporation). Chief Justice 
Marshall had earlier expressed this view of a corporation as a “mere creature” of the law 
deriving its power only from incorporation in Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 127 (1804). 
40 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636. 
41 Id. Several years after Dartmouth College, in Providence Bank v. Billings, Chief 
Justice Marshall reaffirmed this principle. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560 (1830) (“It has been 
settled that a contract entered into between a state and an individual, is as fully protected by 
the tenth section of the first article of the constitution, as a contract between two 
individuals . . . .”). 
 42 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636. 
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Earle.43 The case concerned whether a bank had legal existence to enter into a 
valid contract outside of the state in which it was incorporated.44 The Court noted 
that in an earlier case, Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,45 it had looked to the 
individuals composing a corporation to decide whether the corporation had a right 
to sue in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.46 But the Court declined to 
extend this reasoning and look behind the corporation to see if its members were 
all citizens of Georgia and thereby treat the corporation as entitled to the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of Alabama.47 
The Court expressed concern that if it were to look behind the corporation to 
the aggregate of individuals, as if the corporation were a partnership, it would 
undermine the rationale for corporate limited liability that was gaining acceptance 
at the time.48 The Court explained: 
 
If . . . members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals 
carrying on business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to the 
privileges of citizens in matters of contract, it is very clear that they must 
at the same time take upon themselves the liabilities of citizens, and be 
bound by their contracts in like manner. . . . [and] be liable to the whole 
extent of [their] property for the debts of the corporation . . . .49  
 
The Court, however, noted that states would likely recognize the charters 
granted by other states as a matter of comity. This practice, the Court reasoned, 
would treat the corporation as “a person, for certain purposes in contemplation of 
law,” like natural persons who contract in other states and “nobody has ever 
doubted the validity of these agreements.”50 
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, a corporation was not a “citizen” within 
the meaning of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the corporate 
charter was protected by the Contracts Clause, the corporation was recognized as 
                                                 
43  38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–87 (1839). The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
provides “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
44 Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 585. 
45 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 




50 Id. at 588. The Court reaffirmed its decision that corporations are not citizens 
entitled to the benefits of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the well-known case, 
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), but its later Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence undercut the impact of Bank of Augusta and Paul. See infra Part II.D. 
Further, corporations’ ability to do business in other states was aided by the Court’s 
indication in Paul that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce included interstate 
transactions involving corporations. See KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 114 & n.9 
(discussing Paul and permissive corporate enabling laws providing an environment for 
interstate competition). 
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having properties of “individuality,” and the corporation was conceived of as a 
“person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law.” This protected 
shareholders’ property and contract interests in the entity.51 
Notably, this personification of the corporation in the constitutional sense was 
different than the “legal personality” that courts, dating back to earlier English 
law,52 had already recognized in giving corporations certain business capabilities. 
Legal personality of corporations included the ability to contract, own property, 
sue and be sued in the corporate name. Specifically, the corporate ability to own 
property53 and to sue and be sued54 were considered incident to the corporate form 
at common law. Courts also recognized corporations as having the ability to 
contract in their own name, but historically treated this under the ultra vires 
doctrine as a capacity limited by the corporate charter.55 These rights allowed the 
                                                 
51 For a discussion of classical corporate theory that includes an interpretation of the 
early corporate personhood doctrine as the Supreme Court’s solution to two property-
related problems, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1640–41 (1988) (noting the doctrine protected corporate 
property like property held by an individual owner, and allowed the directors or managers, 
rather than the shareholders, to assert constitutional claims to protect corporate property). 
52  For example, in his 1793 Treatise on the Law of Corporations, Stewart Kyd 
described a corporation as “vested by the policy of the law, with a capacity of acting, in 
several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, contracting 
obligations, and of suing and being sued.” Lamoreaux, supra note 25, at 32 (quoting 
STEWART KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1793)). 
53 See, e.g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 584 (1865) (quoting Lord 
Denman in an older English case and referencing as established law: “[t]he corporation is 
the legal owner of all of the property . . . and . . . can deal with the corporate property as 
absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own”); see also CLARK, supra note 16, 
at 19 (describing functions of legal personality for corporation, including the ability of a 
corporation to own property in its own name). 
54 See, e.g., Leggett v. N.J. Mfg. & Banking Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 541, 541 (N.J. Ch. 1832) 
(“The powers of a corporation are, strictly speaking, two-fold; those that are derived from 
express grant, and those that are incident and necessarily appertain to it, whether expressed 
in the grant or not. The power to make by-laws, to make and use a common seal, and the 
right to sue are incident to every corporation.”); 9 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4226 (perm. ed., rev. 
vol. 1999) (“The power to sue and be sued is one of the inherent powers of a corporation 
and is among the incidental or implied powers that have been attributed to corporations 
from the earliest period.”). But cf. Cmty. Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v. Schaffer, 639 
N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1994) (corporations are creatures of statute and require statutory 
authority to sue and be sued). 
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 18 (1979); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON 
& RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:1 (4th ed. 1993) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12, cmt. b). For example, in Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, the Court made clear that capacity to contract had to be conferred by charter: “a 
corporation can make no contracts, and do no acts either within or without the state which 
creates it, except such as are authorized by its charter; and those acts must also be done, by 
such officers or agents, and in such manner as the charter authorizes.” 38 U.S. at 587. 
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corporation to carry on business as a legal entity separate and distinct from the 
shareholders. 56  Indeed, recent scholarship has specifically examined the 
importance of legal personality for providing: (1) a separation of assets between 
the corporation, shareholders, managers, and creditors,57 and (2) an environment 
for maintaining resources and capital in the corporation over the long term.58 
Although these entity attributes do not directly implicate the doctrine of 
corporate personhood,59 this section shows that early corporate personhood cases 
are nonetheless akin to the concept of legal personality insofar as the constitutional 
jurisprudence bolstered the corporation as a separate entity from its shareholders 
and protected the property interests of the shareholders in the corporate property. 
Recognizing the corporate charter as covered by the Contract Clause and the 
corporation’s property as protected by the Due Process Clause stabilized the 
corporate form as a viable organization for long-term private investment. 
Not only was the corporation a distinct contracting party with a separate pool 
of assets from its shareholders, managers and creditors, but it was also separate 
from the government.60 Furthermore, the notion of legal personality is consistent 
with early case law such as Dartmouth College that recognized corporations as 
legal fictions having the capacities and characteristics given to them in the 
corporate charter, such as “individuality.” 61  This treated the corporation, for 
Contracts Clause purposes, as a contract creating a separate entity through which 
people conducted business or carried out their identified objectives. 
 
C.  Trend for General Incorporation and Changing Theories  
About Corporate Personality 
 
As the personification of the corporation developed under the concession 
view, such as in Dartmouth College, a movement was rising to attack the way that 
                                                 
56 See Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 587 (“Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it 
is the contract of the legal entity; of the artificial being created by the charter; and not the 
contract of the individual members.”); JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.2, at 2–3 
(1997) (“A business corporation is . . . a legal unit with a status or capacity of its own 
separate from the other shareholders or members who own it. . . . The corporation holds 
property, enters into contracts, executes conveyances, and conducts litigation in a legal 
capacity separate and distinct from its shareholders.”). 
57  REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 6–15 (2004). Authors Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman had earlier set out their views in The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History], and The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann & 
Kraakman, Organizational Law]. 
58 Blair, supra note 16, at 387. 
59  See Hansmann & Kraakman, Organizational Law, supra note 57, at 438–39 
(distinguishing the authors’ discussion of the corporation’s essential entity attributes from 
the literature on the nature of the corporate legal person). 
60 See id. at 392–93, 438–39. 
61 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
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corporate charters were specially granted. These attacks were based on fears about 
a concentration of power and wealth as well as political corruption and 
monopoly. 62  The “free incorporation” movement of the Jacksonian period 
eventually triumphed in its attack on special chartering.63 By the 1850s, many 
states had enacted “enabling” corporate laws eliminating the need for legislative 
action to incorporate. 64  These general incorporation laws turned the special 
privilege of incorporation for purposes like public works into a mere 
administrative formality. 65  By the end of the nineteenth century, general 
incorporation was the norm across the states, providing simple procedures for 
obtaining charters for any lawful business, including the manufacturing that fueled 
the Industrial Revolution.66 
The economic expansion of the time and the transition from special chartering 
to general incorporation eroded the persuasiveness of the concession theory, as the 
connection between a corporate charter and a state act became less significant.67 
States like New Jersey and Delaware began to compete for corporate taxes and 
fees by offering a liberal legal environment for incorporation.68 As the ultra vires 
doctrine had flowed from the concession view of the corporation, courts began to 
relax their insistence that all corporate actions be taken within the stated purpose of 
                                                 
62 See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73. Special charters were viewed as prone to an 
undesirable concentration of power and wealth because they were understood as often 
conferring monopoly privileges to conduct a certain business, such as to build or operate a 
public work. KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 113–14. They were also viewed as not 
generally available, as “[t]hose able to lobby state legislatures could obtain a corporate 
charter, while less influential or affluent people could not.” Id. at 114. Adding fuel to the 
criticisms of corporations in the mid-nineteenth century, a number of public scandals 
occurred involving corporations securing political favors. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 
512–13. 
63 See HURST, supra note 9, at 30–36 (discussing the Jacksonian period starting in the 
1830s and the movement against special charters); see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73 
(“Despite the Supreme Court’s continued hesitance, by 1900 the entity theory had largely 
triumphed . . . .”). 
64 HURST, supra note 9, at 18; Linowes, supra note 9, at 346. 
65 HURST, supra note 9, at 18. 
66 See id. at 37. 
67 Linowes, supra note 9, at 351; see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–74 (“By 
rendering the corporate form normal and regular, late-nineteenth-century corporate theory 
shifted the presumption of corporate regulation against the state.”); HURST, supra note 9, at 
135 (“In the early years special chartering reflected the habits of legal thought and the 
concern with the power of organized groups which found shorthand expression in the 
concession theory . . . . [n]evertheless, special corporate charters did disappear from 1870’s 
on . . . .”); Piety, supra note 34, at 2621 (“[The] concept of the business corporation—as an 
organization with a quasi-public function and strict regulation by government—situated the 
corporation in its early days . . . .”). 
68 See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 114; Piety, supra note 34, at 
2621–22. 
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the corporation. Instead, courts implied the powers necessary or proper for the 
corporation’s business.69 
While support for the concession view of the corporation faded, the nature of 
corporate personality became one of the most prominent legal debates of the 
time.70 Although the competing theories took many different names, three views 
and their variants fundamentally dominated the debate.71 These theories directly 
influenced the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century view of corporate personality. 
The first was the concession theory discussed above, which, although on the 
decline, continued to find voice. 
In contrast, the second view, the “aggregate” theory, looked through the 
corporate form to the individuals behind it. This view regarded the corporation as a 
collection of its individual members, the shareholders.72 The theory had roots in a 
view of the corporation as a partnership or contract among the shareholders.73 
The third view, the “real entity” theory, was only beginning to emerge in the 
late nineteenth century America.74 Also known as the natural entity or person 
                                                 
69 HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 77–78; HURST, supra note 9, at 157–58; see also, e.g., 
Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 191 P. 905, 907–08 (Cal. 1920) (discussing the implied 
powers initially held by corporations); Equitable Holding Co. v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n, 279 N.W. 736, 739–40 (Minn. 1938) (discussing the necessary actions of a 
corporation’s business); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Gate City Optical Co., 97 S.W.2d 89, 92 
(Mo. 1936) (stating that a corporation has the same rights as a person to contract); In re 
German Jewish Children’s Aid, 272 N.Y.S. 540, 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (holding that 
corporations have implied powers to carry out those expressly granted). 
70 Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494, 494 (1938) 
(“Philosophers and sociologists, historians and jurists have given grave consideration to 
this matter. Jurists have discussed it particularly in dealing with constitutional law, 
jurisprudence, legal history, company law, contracts and torts. On the Continent the 
number of jurists who attempt to grapple with this problem is so large that legal authors 
may be divided into two groups: those who have written on the nature of legal persons, and 
those who have not yet done so.”); see also Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 
1464–67 (1987) (discussing the modern development of a corporation’s legal personality in 
the United States). 
71 The terminology for these theories can be confusing because commentators and 
jurists have sometimes used the terms interchangeably, separately, or inconsistently and 
there are many variations on the theories. See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 72–74; Mayer, 
supra note 7; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201–02 
(1990). 
72 Mark, supra note 70, at 1457–59; see also ROBERT HESSON, IN DEFENSE OF THE 
CORPORATION xv (1979) (stating that “a corporation is in fact an association of individuals 
who are entitled to the same rights and legal protections which apply to all other 
individuals and organizations”). 
73 See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 75. 
74 See id. at 70–71 (arguing that the real entity theory did not fully develop in America 
until the turn of the century, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara); see also 
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
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theory, this view regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate existence 
from its shareholders and from the state.75 Some proponents of this view described 
the corporation as greater than the sum of its parts, 76  and as existing before 
recognition of law.77 This view of corporations as “real” and “natural” suggested 
inherent, inviolable rights.78 
 
D.  Santa Clara: Recognizing the Corporation as a “Person”  
under the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
In the midst of this prominent debate about the nature of corporate 
personality, the Court took another step in the development of its nineteenth 
century corporate personhood jurisprudence. The famous, or infamous, Santa 
Clara case79 marks this step, notwithstanding its unusual circumstances. The case 
has come to stand for the proposition that corporations are “persons” within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Santa Clara concerned taxation of railroad property. Specifically, the case 
posed the relatively mundane question whether a tax assessment was void because 
the state board improperly included railroad fences that instead should have been 
assessed by the local authorities.80 Alternatively, the case posed the larger question 
whether California property tax laws unconstitutionally treated railroads differently 
from other corporations and individuals. 81  By the time this case came to the 
Supreme Court, railroad corporations had already tried unsuccessfully to get 
federal courts to construe the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting corporations.82 
In this case, the defendant railroads argued that a provision of the California 
constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment by providing a deduction for the 
value of mortgages from property assessed for tax purposes, with the exclusion of 
                                                 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485–91 (1989) (discussing the legal changes that 
corporations underwent during the latter part of the nineteenth century). 
75 HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–75. 
76 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 495 (2001). 
77 See, e.g., Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 
261 (1911) (“A corporation exists as an objectively real entity, which any well-developed 
child or normal man must perceive: the law merely recognizes and gives legal effect to the 
existence of this entity.”). 
78 Dewey, supra note 8, at 669. 
79 Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95 (1886). 
80 Id. at 396–97, 412–14. 
81 Id. at 409–11. 
82 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 160 (1876); Peik v. 
Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co, 94 U.S. 164, 167–68 (1876); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. 
Ackley, 94 U.S. 179, 179 (1876); Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180, 180 
(1876). 
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railroad corporations. 83  The railroad corporations argued that this imposed 
“unequal burdens” on them and thus denied them “equal protection of the laws.”84 
John Norton Pomeroy, the railroad lawyer in the Santa Clara case, 
emphasized that associations of natural persons complying with just a few 
administrative formalities could organize themselves as a corporation and thus 
corporations should have rights as would the individuals behind them.85 The focus 
was on property rights: “The truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of 
protecting rights, the property of all business and trading corporations IS the 
property of the individual corporators.” 86  This aggregate conception of the 
corporation was not so different from a partnership or an image of individuals 
contracting amongst themselves. This was, however, only one aspect of his 
argument as the case involved other issues and grounds upon which the Court 
could base its decision. 
Before oral argument, Chief Justice Waite stated:  
 
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of 
opinion that it does.87  
 
The court reporter documented this comment in the headnotes to the opinion.88 
The opinion itself, written by Justice Harlan, based the decision on another 
ground, that the state board lacked jurisdiction to assess the value of the fences and 
thus the tax assessment at issue was void.89 The Court expressly stated in the 
opinion that because it was basing its judgment on this narrow ground “it [wa]s not 
necessary to consider any other questions raised by the pleadings and the facts 
found by the court.”90 
                                                 
83 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 409. 
84 Id. 
85 HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 69–70. 
86 Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Argument for Defendant, San Mateo v. S. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885)). 
87 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. 
88 Preceding the report of Chief Justice Waite’s comment, the headnotes state: “One 
of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error 
was that Corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
89 Id. at 416. 
90 Id. Several months later, in preparing the U.S. Reports volume, the court reporter 
sent a note to Chief Justice Waite asking if he had “correctly caught” the comment before 
oral argument. Chief Justice Waite replied: “I think your mem. in the California Railroad 
Tax cases expresses with sufficient accuracy what was said before the argument began. I 
leave it with you to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report 
inasmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision.” Letter from 
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Subsequently, contrary to normal practice, Chief Justice Waite’s pre-
argument pronouncement has been taken as a ruling that corporations are persons 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 Because the opinion does not 
explicitly state this ruling or provide any discussion, reasoning, or authority related 
to this issue, it is unclear on what basis this pronouncement was grounded.92 
The case law leading up to Santa Clara arguably offers some insight into the 
rationale for Chief Justice Waite’s pronouncement. The Court had earlier 
construed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting 
recently freed slaves, not business firms.93 Not all members of the Court agreed. In 
a notable dissent, Justice Field had argued for a more expansive construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.94 Later, in related California tax cases leading up to Santa 
Clara, Justice Field, while sitting on circuit, ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment 
extended to all persons and that this included corporations. Recognizing 
corporations as “artificial persons” consisting of “aggregations of individuals,” 
Justice Field emphasized that the corporation represented individuals with property 
                                                 
Chief Justice Waite to Supreme Court Reporter J.C. Bancroft Davis (May 26, 1886) 
(quoted in HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 567 (1968)). 
91 See infra Part II.E. 
92  As might be expected, the unusual circumstances of this case have evoked 
skepticism and debate. For example, a “conspiracy theory” arose that corporate lawyers on 
the joint congressional committee that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment had craftily 
chosen language or foreseen that “persons” would include corporations. GRAHAM, supra 
note 90, at 566–68 (explaining that the conspiracy theory grew out of a Supreme Court 
argument by Roscoe Conkling in 1882); John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate 
Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 131, 138 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (explaining 
that the conspiracy theory has been discounted (citing Howard Jay Graham, The 
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48 YALE L.J. 171 
(1938)). Some commentators have characterized the decision as an example of how 
decision-makers can misuse and manipulate legal concepts to hide underlying ideological 
preferences. See, e.g., id. at 137–39 (arguing that Justice Field “saw the function of 
Fourteenth Amendment personhood status for corporations . . . as a means for 
implementing a laissez-faire economic policy for business interests and establishing 
constitutional rights of property on an almost absolutist basis”). Many jurists and scholars 
have observed that corporations made more use of the Fourteenth Amendment than the 
individuals the amendment was designed to protect. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89–90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing the amendment sought 
to prevent racial discrimination by the states but that in the first fifty years after adoption 
more than 50 percent of the cases invoking its protection involved corporations and less 
than 1 percent involved the racial classes it was meant to protect); Mark Tushnet, 
Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 256 (1982) (“Thus, the Court 
converted an amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an 
amendment whose major effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights of 
corporations.”). 
93 See cases cited supra note 82; see also Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 
(1873) (interpreting the meaning and application of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
94 See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 89–111 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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interests.95 Even though shareholders do not own specific corporate assets, Justice 
Field explained that shareholders’ interests had “an appreciable value, and is 
property in a commercial sense” so that their property interests were implicated in 
depriving the corporation of property or burdening it.96 
 
E.  Post-Santa Clara and Corporate Due Process Rights 
 
If there was any question about the status of the Santa Clara pronouncement 
in the court reporter’s headnotes, the Court shortly made clear that it would rely 
upon it as precedent. In a number of subsequent cases, the Court recognized the 
Santa Clara pronouncement and expanded the ruling to due process. The context 
for these cases again involved the enjoyment and protection of property and 
contract interests. The Court did not, however, provide consistent reasoning to 
undergird Santa Clara in these subsequent decisions. 
As a preliminary matter, two years after Santa Clara, the Court relied on the 
decision and expressed the aggregate view of the corporation that Justice Field had 
championed while sitting on circuit. In Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining and 
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 97  involving a corporation raising a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, the Court explained:  
 
Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a 
special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name, 
and have a succession of members without dissolution. . . . The equal 
protection of the laws which these bodies may claim is only such as is 
accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the State.98 
  
However, in rejecting an alternative claim that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause applied to corporations, the Court relied on an earlier case and rationale that 
emphasized the concession theory: “[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause, 
applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to 
                                                 
95 The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 740–44 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (“[W]e think that it 
is well established . . . that whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law, guarantees 
to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for its protection, or 
prohibits legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision extend to 
corporations, and that the courts will always look beyond the name of the artificial being to 
the individuals whom it represents.”). 
96 Id. at 747 (“To deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to 
deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value. Their interest, undivided 
though it be, and constituting only a right during the continuance of the corporation to 
participate in its dividends, and on its dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its 
assets, has an appreciable value, and is property in a commercial sense; and whatever 
affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects the commercial value of their 
interest.”). 
97 125 U.S. 181 (1888). 
98 Id. at 189. 
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the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only 
such attributes as the legislature has prescribed.”99 
Thus the Court recognized the Santa Clara pronouncement in Pembina, but 
oscillated in its reasoning between viewing a corporation as an aggregate of 
individuals meriting rights and alternately as a concession of the state justifying 
limitations on rights. Accordingly, as in its earlier case law, the Court accorded 
corporations equal protection with regard to property interests as it would similar 
associations but did not confuse corporations with individuals themselves, who 
have citizenship rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.100 
One year later, in Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad v. Beckwith,101 the 
Court relied on Santa Clara and Pembina Mining to hold that corporations could 
invoke Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.102 Specifically, the Court 
stated: 
 
It is contended by counsel as the basis of his argument, and we admit the 
soundness of his position, that corporations are persons within the 
meaning of the clause in question [the Fourteenth Amendment]. It was so 
held in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., and the 
doctrine was reasserted in Pembina Mining Co v. Pennsylvania. We 
admit also, as contended by him, that corporations can invoke the 
benefits of provisions of the Constitution and laws which guaranty to 
persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them the means for its 
protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.103 
 
Although the Court discussed the scope of the due process protection, the Court 
did not further explain the basis for allowing corporations to invoke it.104 The case 
provided merely an affirmation of the right and its property-based rationale. 
The Court also extended Fifth Amendment due process protection to 
corporate property in Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co.,105 in which an 
act of the secretary of the interior would have revoked and annulled an existing 
grant of public lands to a railroad corporation.106 The Court did not explain why 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause should apply to corporations, but noted 
that it viewed the revocation as “an attempt to deprive the plaintiff [corporation] of 
its property without due process of law.”107 
                                                 
99 Id. at 187–88. 
100 See id. 
101 129 U.S. 26 (1889). 
102 Id. at 27–28. 
103 Id. at 28. 
104 Id. at 28–36. 
105 147 U.S. 165 (1892). 
106 The Noble Court did not explain its application of the Fifth Amendment to a 
corporation, but as the defendant was the federal government, the case has been understood 
as a due process case under the Fifth Amendment. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 591. 
107 Noble, 147 U.S. at 274. 
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III.  BEYOND THE DOCTRINE’S ROOTS: UNGROUNDED EXPANSIONS 
 
While the nineteenth century saw the rise of the corporation and ushered in 
cases focused on rights related to shareholders’ property and contract interests, the 
twentieth century staged a significant expansion of corporate rights beyond this 
context. Despite robust debate of corporate personality from the turn of the century 
to the 1930s, as well as dissenting calls for reexamination of the doctrine, the Court 
has not grounded the expansions of corporate rights in a coherent concept of 
corporate personhood nor used a consistent approach in determining the scope of 
corporate rights. At times, the Court has used varying conceptions of the 
corporation; it has relied on nineteenth century cases that were decided in the 
context of property and contract rights; it has focused on the history or purpose of 
a particular amendment; and it has even accorded a right to corporations without 
explanation. Mapping the panoply of corporate rights and the rationale for them 
has become increasingly complex, and what the doctrine of corporate personhood 
stands for has become obscured. 
This section traces this ungrounded expansion beyond the doctrine’s roots by 
examining the Court’s recognition of corporate criminal liability, the theoretical 
debates and the modernization of the business corporation, the calls for 
reexamination in the post-Lochner era, and the later-established suite of corporate 
rights. The only common thread through the doctrine’s origins and subsequent 
developments is the notion that corporations may hold rights in order to protect the 
individuals behind them. This is an important principle, but it does not speak to 
whether corporations should have a particular right; it only provides a starting 
point of analysis. 
 
A.  Recognition of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
Tracing the corporate personhood doctrine in the twentieth century begins 
with the observation that the flip side of personifying the corporation was 
increased interest in corporate criminal liability. Some scholars suggest that the 
personification of the corporation in the law indeed inspired a transformed concept 
of the corporation as a legal person capable of criminal wrongs.108 Despite this 
                                                 
108 See WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE 
OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 11–12 (“Santa Clara County personified corporations 
at a time when states realized that permissive chartering laws could generate vast amounts 
of needed revenue. In transforming the conception of a corporation from a lifeless, artificial 
being, to a legal person, by allowing businesses to incorporate freely, and with the 
divergence of municipal and business corporations, the criminal law became the state’s 
response to all sorts of corporate wrongs, from the indictment of railroad companies for the 
killing of pedestrians by improperly designed and recklessly operated trolley cars to 
elaborate prosecutions of conglomerate companies for illegal combinations.”). But see 
Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 263–64 (1991) (arguing that the 
personality of a corporation should not matter for purposes of criminal liability). 
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significant departure from the property and contract context in which the Court had 
established corporate personhood, the Court did not strengthen the reasoning 
underpinning this expanding reach of the corporate personhood doctrine. 
This is striking because many of the constitutional rights that corporations 
enjoy are an outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject to 
criminal liability. For example, if corporations were not subject to criminal liability 
there would be no need to consider whether they should receive double jeopardy 
protection. One would expect that in this crucial post-Santa Clara period the Court 
would bolster its rationale for the constitutional treatment of corporations, 
particularly in deciding whether to expose corporations to criminal liability, a 
different question than the Court had previously addressed in recognizing 
corporations as persons in order to protect shareholders’ property and contract 
interests in the corporation. But instead, as one commentator has noted, 
organizational criminal liability grew like a weed without a rationale.109 
Early common law had rejected the idea of imposing criminal responsibility 
on corporations because of conceptual obstacles such as attributing an act and 
intent to a corporation,110 but by the early twentieth century courts found a broader 
approach to imposing liability. With little theoretical grounding, courts imported 
tort and agency principles to hold corporations vicariously liable for criminal acts 
performed by corporate agents within the scope of employment.111 
 In Hale v. Henkel, decided in 1906, 112  the Supreme Court held that a 
corporation did not have the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but 
did have a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.113 
                                                 
109 Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 21 
(1957) (“Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”). 
110 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 
(1909) (citing Chief Justice Holt and Blackstone and explaining that early common law 
held a corporation could not commit a crime); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
476 (1765) (“[A] corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s [sic] 
corporate capacity.”). For a more detailed history of corporate criminal liability in England 
and America, see Brickey, supra note 17, at 396–400, 404–15. 
111 See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); United 
States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1898); see also Brickey, supra note 17, 
at 404–15 (discussing the evolution of corporate accountability in the United States); 
Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for 
Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 115 (2010) (discussing the 
impediments to holding a corporation criminally liable). 
112 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
113 Id. at 69–70, 76–77. The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be . . . 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Court’s treatment of corporations in Hale does 
not seem to rest on a textual basis as the Fourth Amendment uses the word “people” 
whereas the Fifth Amendment uses the word “person.” One scholar has suggested that 
pragmatism may have driven this decision as granting corporations the privilege against 
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In so holding, the Court oscillated between reasoning based on the concession, 
aggregate and real entity views, balancing the recognition that “[c]orporations are a 
necessary feature of modern business activity,” with the sense that the state that 
creates the corporation must preserve its ability to regulate.114 
 In New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, 
decided in 1909,115 the Supreme Court definitively recognized corporate criminal 
liability and expanded the respondeat superior approach based on “public policy” 
rather than any particular view of the corporation. 116  The case involved a 
government indictment against a railroad and two of its officers for giving 
unlawful rebates under the Elkins Act. The corporation argued that the Elkins Act 
was unconstitutional because Congress lacked authority to impute criminal acts to 
a corporation, which would effectively punish innocent stockholders and deprive 
them of due process. The Supreme Court rejected the corporation’s aggregate-style 
argument on the “public policy” basis that doing otherwise would give the 
corporation “immunity from all punishment because of the old and exploded 
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime.”117 According to the Court, this 
“would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”118 
Thus, relying on multiple views of the corporation and “public policy,” the 
Court expanded the corporate-person metaphor to the criminal context, involving a 
different set of questions than the protection of property and contracts. The 
limitations of the Court’s conceptions of the corporation became apparent as the 
Court oscillated between them, sometimes even in the same opinion.119 The only 
unifying strand between these disparate cases was the recognition of corporations 
as capable of holding rights or liabilities. 
 
                                                 
self-incrimination could have critically impeded criminal prosecution of corporations, 
whereas giving corporations some protection against unreasonable government searches 
and seizures would not entirely insulate corporations from criminal enforcement. See Peter 
J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent 
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. 
L. REV. 793, 797 (1996). 
114 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 69–76. 
115 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
116 See id. at 483, 494–96. 
117 Id. at 496. 
118 Id. 
119 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–76 (1906); see also id. at 79–83 (McKenna, 
J., concurring) (noting the internal incoherence between the Court’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment analysis); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: 
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 599–601 
(1996) (discussing the Court’s use of multiple conceptions of the corporation and 
pragmatism, noting “the Court’s preposterous classifications of the same corporation as 
both an artificial and a natural entity.”). 
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B.  The Rise of the Modern Business Corporation and the “End” of the Theoretical 
Debate About Corporate Personhood 
 
In the early twentieth century, debate about corporate personality reached a 
fever pitch, spanning the United States and Europe, the fields of law and 
philosophy, and then faded just as the business corporation entered a 
transformative period.120 The direction of the legal debate about corporations and 
their ontological nature moved to legal realism, the view that theories of corporate 
personality, such as reflected in the concession, aggregate, and real entity views, 
were indeterminate. Many commentators view John Dewey’s 1926 Yale Law 
Journal article as having put an end to the corporate personhood debate.121 Dewey 
dismissed the debate as pointless because “‘person’ signifies what law makes it 
signify.”122 Building on the English jurist Frederic Maitland’s statement that the 
corporation is “a right-and-duty-bearing unit,” Dewey pragmatically argued that 
“person” “convey[s] no implications, except that the unit has those rights and 
duties from which the courts find it to have.”123 
According to Dewey, the significance of “person” in common speech or 
philosophy is irrelevant.124 Assumptions about inherent attributes that a unit must 
have to be a juridical person, such as implied concepts of personality or inherent 
essence, were wrongly imported into legal discussion and generated “confusion 
and conflict.” 125  Dewey concluded that “there is no clear-cut line, logical or 
practical, through the different theories which have been advanced”; “[e]ach theory 
has been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing 
ends.” 126  In brief, political ideology was driving adherence to the competing 
theories. Accordingly, he advocated “eliminating the idea of personality until the 
concrete facts and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own 
account: retaining the word will then do no great harm.” 127  The corporate 
personality debate needed a more concrete understanding of society’s interests and 
the functional relations involved. 
Around this time, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means also published their 
influential book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 128  The book 
                                                 
120 HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 100–05. 
121  Multiple commentators have observed that Dewey’s article put an end to the 
debate, for example HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 68; Bratton, Jr., supra note 74, at 1491; 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1527 (2004) 
(reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004)). 
122 Dewey, supra note 8, at 655. 
123 Id. at 656. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 658. 
126 Id. at 669. 
127 Id. at 673. 
128 ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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came after the beginning of a major transformation at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Corporations exploded in number and size, 129  corporate ownership 
diversified and dispersed, and a national stock market emerged.130 Stock ownership 
was on the rise: the number of shareholders of American corporations more than 
quadrupled between 1900 and 1928.131  The rise of a national stock market132 
hastened the development of a class of corporate managers and the conversion of 
shareholders’ role into passive investors.133 Whereas previously large businesses 
had often been owned by an individual or small group of individuals, large 
businesses were increasingly owned by a dispersed group of shareholders.134 
In their well-known work, Berle and Means focused attention on this growing 
dispersion of stock ownership and the separation of ownership and managerial 
control in corporate governance.135 This concept eroded the view of shareholders 
as “owners” of the corporation and revealed the conflicting interests of the people 
involved with the corporation. 136  Delegating control of the corporation to 
professional managers created costs as the managers might not act for the benefit 
of the shareholders. Shareholders had moved from a position of private ownership 
to merely acting as passive recipients of capital returns. According to Berle and 
                                                 
129 The number of corporations increased exponentially in the nineteenth century and 
state corporation laws eased their earlier strictures. Whereas by 1800 there were about 300 
corporations, mostly with a quasi-public purpose, by the turn of the twentieth century, there 
were approximately 500,000 business corporations. Blair, supra note 16, at 389 n.3. 
Corporations were no longer associated with achieving a quasi-public purpose for the 
public benefit; many enterprises engaged in manufacturing and trade for private gain. 
States’ relatively strict reign of corporations through limited powers granted in charters, 
rules prohibiting stock ownership in other corporations, and other limitations had faded 
away. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–74, 80–84; Mark, supra note 70, at 1444–
45. 
130 See ALFRED CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 94–95. 
131 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128, at 53, 56. 
132 Between 1890 and 1893, the New York Stock Exchange began to list “industrials.” 
HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 95. After 1897, companies publicly offered shares of stock. Id. 
This replaced the previous system of private subscriptions. Id. Between 1896 and 1907, the 
number of shares traded on the Stock Exchange increased from 57 million to 260 million. 
Id. 
133 Id. at 95–97. 
134 See CHANDLER, JR., supra note 130, at 79–205, 287–89. 
135  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128; see also CHANDLER, JR., supra note 130 
(discussing the development of the modern business corporation and the rise of 
managerialism in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century); Mark, supra note 70, at 
1475 (discussing Ernst Freund’s views and contributions to management hierarchy in 
modern corporations); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (discussing the development of the 
large corporation with dispersed share ownership in the context of American politics). 
136  See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 18–19 (1986) 
(discussing the impact of Berle and Means); BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
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Means, “[c]orporations . . . ceased to be merely legal devices through which the 
private business transactions of individuals may be carried on.”137 
In any event, “[b]y 1930 the dialogue had largely run its course, with the 
general consensus being that a corporation was an important legal form which was 
more than a mere contractual aggregation but which could not truly be equated 
with a natural person.”138 After this debate quieted, most corporate law scholars 
simply accepted corporate personhood as a given, without pushing for a particular 
philosophical conception of the corporation to ground this concept.139 
 
C.  A Transitional Period in Judicial Approach 
 
In the legal world, the nineteenth century cases that provided corporations 
with equal protection and due process rights had built a foundation for 
corporations—as constitutional “persons”—to seek substantive due process in the 
early twentieth century. After the landmark Lochner decision in 1905, 140 
corporations posed many challenges to state statutes under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the substantive due process doctrine. 141  Thus, protecting 
corporations from a wide variety of government regulation emerged as a broader 
effect of recognizing corporate personhood.142 
In the mid-1930s, the Court changed its direction with the substantive due 
process doctrine. 143  The Court did not reconsider its interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to corporate personhood, however, despite 
                                                 
137  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128, at 56 (Table VIII) (estimated number of 
shareholders in the United States in 1900 was 4.4 million and in 1928 was 18 million). 
138  Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 479 (2004). Some literature around this time suggests that there was 
at least a trickle left of discussion. See, e.g., ALEXANDER NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY 
CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Corporate Personality, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1930) (book review); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of 
Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932); Martin Wolff, On the Nature of 
Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494 (1938). 
139 Skeel, Jr., supra note 121, at 1527. 
140 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–54 (1905) (invalidating a state statute 
limiting the working hours of bakery employees by reading into the Fourteenth 
Amendment a requirement for economic substantive due process and freedom of contract). 
141 Mayer, supra note 7, at 588–92. 
142 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 613 (3d ed. 
2006) (“[I]n 1886, the Supreme Court held that corporations were ‘persons’ under the due 
process and equal protection clauses. This meant, of course, that corporations could use the 
Constitution . . . to challenge government regulations.”). Some have argued that this 
constitutes a relative narrowing of individual rights and power. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 
92, at 132. 
143 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling a liberty 
of contract decision, Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 622–25 (discussing the Court’s move away from the 
Lochner era). 
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several notable dissents as well as the significant corporate changes and the end of 
the debate about corporate personality, as discussed above. 
For example, in Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson,144 applying precedent 
treating corporations as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority 
held that a California statute violated the Due Process Clause by taxing a 
Connecticut insurance company on receipt in Connecticut of reinsurance premiums 
for risks originally insured in California.145 No act related to the contracts took 
place in California and the performance of the contracts did not depend upon any 
privilege or authority granted by California. 146  In his dissent, Justice Black 
emphasized that the history and plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“sought to prevent discrimination by the states against classes or races” and did not 
include corporations.147 Invoking the Court’s recent West Coast Hotel148 decision 
that changed direction on the substantive due process doctrine, he called on the 
Court to overrule precedents interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as including 
corporations: 
 
I do not believe the word “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes corporations. The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate 
and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field of 
constitutional law. This Court has many times changed its interpretations 
of the Constitution when the conclusion was reached that an improper 
construction had been adopted. Only recently the case of West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, expressly overruled a previous interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which had long blocked state minimum wage 
legislation. . . . I believe this Court should now overrule previous 
decisions which interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include 
corporations.149 
 
Justice Black explained the lack of historical and textual basis for interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment as including corporations. 150  He characterized the 
implication of this interpretation as “granting new and revolutionary rights to 
corporations” that “deprive[d] the states of their long-recognized power to regulate 
corporations.”151 Further, he argued that the people and the states did not adopt the 
amendment with the intent of granting these rights or with the knowledge that it 
would be so construed: “The history of the Amendment proves that the people 
were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were 
not told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control 
                                                 
144 303 U.S. 77 (1938). 
145 Id. at 80–82. 
146 Id. at 81. 
147 Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting). 
148 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
149 Conn. Gen. Co., 303 U.S. at 85 (Black, J., dissenting). 
150 Id. at 85–90. 
151 Id. at 86, 89. 
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of state governments.” 152  Justice Black concluded that the Court should not 
construe the Fourteenth Amendment to include corporations, and noted that if 
Americans wanted to give corporations this protection they could amend the 
Constitution.153 
Some years later, together with Justice Black, Justice Douglas dissented on 
the same basis in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,154 another case concerning 
taxation of an out-of-state corporation.155 However, in the majority opinion, Justice 
Jackson deemed it unnecessary to reconsider Fourteenth Amendment corporate 
personhood, and wrote separately to explain: 
 
It was not questioned by the State in this case, nor was it considered by 
the courts below. It has consistently been held by this Court that the 
Fourteenth Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the 
laws, at least since 1886, and that it entitles them to due process of law, 
at least since 1889. 156 
 
Justice Jackson continued, “[i]n view of this record I did not, and still do not, 
consider it necessary for the Court opinion to review the considerations which 
justify the assumption that these corporations have standing to raise the issues 
decided.”157 
A critical opportunity to clarify the Court’s reasoning and approach to 
corporate personhood was thus lost. The Court had recently reexamined its 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to substantive due process158 
and could have likewise reconsidered the basis for corporate personhood. It was 
still relatively early in the development of corporate rights, while the corporation 
was beginning to modernize, and Dewey had drawn attention to the indeterminacy 
of the existing corporate personality views.159 Instead, the Court formalistically 
relied on the conclusion that a corporation is a constitutional person. To be sure, 
                                                 
152 Id. at 87. 
153 Id. at 90 (“If the people of this nation wish to deprive the States of their sovereign 
rights to determine what is a fair and just tax upon corporations doing a purely local 
business within their own state boundaries, there is a way provided by the Constitution to 
accomplish this purpose. That way does not lie along the course of judicial amendment to 
that fundamental charter. An Amendment having that purpose could be submitted by 
Congress as provided by the Constitution. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment 
had that purpose, nor that the people believed it had that purpose, nor that it should be 
construed as having that purpose.”). 
154 337 U.S. 562 (1949). 
155 Id. at 576–81 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
156 Id. at 574 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
157 Id. at 576 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
158 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (overruling a 
previous interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning the freedom of contract, 
which had blocked state wage legislation). 
159 See supra Part III.B. 
2011] RECONCEIVING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 1655 
 
Justice Douglas and Justice Black valiantly called attention to the need for 
reconsideration and the lack of historical and textual support for the corporate 
person conclusion. But their dissents are also problematic in that they failed to 
explain why the individuals behind the corporation should be deprived of the 
protection they would receive if they acted through an unincorporated business.160 
 
D.  The Annex of Corporate Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence 
 
The 1960s marked the beginning of a major expansion of corporate 
constitutional rights and protections.161 At times, the Court has simply accorded a 
right to corporations without explanation. 162  Sometimes echoes of earlier 
conceptions of the corporation have reverberated in the case law or the Court has 
focused on the history or purpose of the amendment at issue on an ad hoc basis.163 
In doing so, the Court often relied on case law that was made in the different 
context of protecting investors’ property and contract interests, at a time when 
many corporations were significantly different. Through this process, corporations 
have received many, but not all, of the protections and guarantees that are afforded 
to natural persons. 164  These can loosely be categorized as rights relating 
                                                 
160 As discussed in Part II.D, the view that the corporation represented individuals 
with protectable property interests may have animated the Court’s pronouncement in Santa 
Clara. The majority in Connecticut General, subtly echoing this view, stated: “A 
corporation which is allowed to come into a state and there carry on its business may claim, 
as an individual may claim, the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against a 
subsequent application to it of state law.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S 77, 
79–80 (1938). Although Justice Douglas made strong historical and textual points about the 
Fourteenth Amendment in his Wheeling Steel dissent, he did not explain how to reconcile 
that under his view people acting in an unincorporated business would receive protections 
that people acting through the corporate form would not. 
161 Mayer, supra note 7, at 620–51. 
162 See id. at 621, 629 (“The Court retreated to pragmatism in response to criticisms of 
corporate personhood theory. . . . Frequently the Court looked to the history of the 
amendment in question to justify corporate rights, as in the case of the fourth amendment; 
occasionally the Court examined the underlying purposes of an amendment, as in its 
handling of the first amendment; and sometimes the Court conferred Bill of Rights 
protections on corporations with no explanation, as with the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
amendments.”); Henning, supra note 113, at 798–99 & n.19 (discussing double jeopardy 
jurisprudence as an example of the Court assuming without explanation that constitutional 
protections apply to corporations). 
163 See Mayer, supra note 7; Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying 
the Eighth Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (1996); Note, 
Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644–45 (1982) 
(“There is no way to bring unity to these many decisions [regarding corporate 
constitutional rights], for they rest on radically different conceptions of the person whose 
rights and duties receive judicial definition.”). 
164 In this Article, the term “rights” refers to legal rights or privileges, not moral 
rights. For a discussion of whether moral rights should be ascribed to corporations, see 
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particularly to property and contract interests, 165  rights related to the criminal 
context such as searches and trials, and finally speech rights. 
While the corporate rights relating particularly to property and contract 
interests are at the root of the nineteenth century corporate personhood doctrine, 
corporate rights related to searches and trials did not originate until the turn of the 
twentieth century and have continued to develop since then. 166  As noted, 
corporations enjoy Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable regulatory 
searches, but do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.167 Corporations enjoy Fifth Amendment protections for liberty and 
against double jeopardy, 168  and arguably Sixth and Seventh Amendment 
entitlements as “persons” to trial by jury.169 
Finally, perhaps receiving the most public attention, corporate speech is 
protected under the First Amendment.170 Broadly speaking, both commercial and 
                                                 
PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); PATRICIA H. 
WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND CORPORATIONS 60–75 (1985). 
165 See Mayer, supra note 7, at 590–91 & n.71; supra Part II.B, D, E. 
166  In a sense, many of the constitutional rights that corporations enjoy are the 
outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject to criminal liability. For 
arguments against corporate criminal liability, see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1484–88 (1996) 
(arguing on efficiency grounds that corporate criminal liability serves no purpose); Daniel 
R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 322 (1996) 
(arguing that corporate criminal liability “is inferior as a practical matter to an appropriate 
corrective on the civil side”); cf. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 846 (2000) (arguing the modern corporation 
has an “independent identity” based on “an identifiable persona and a capacity to express 
moral judgments,” and thus corporate criminal liability can serve a retributive purpose). 
167 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–77 (1906). For a discussion of the development of 
corporate rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see Henning, supra note 113, at 
826–40; Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814–18 
(2005). 
168  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1977) 
(discussing double jeopardy); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (discussing 
double jeopardy); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 969 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause). For a discussion of some restrictions on double jeopardy protection, see Khanna, 
supra note 166, at 1517 n.211. 
169 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–34 (1970); Khanna, supra note 166, at 1518 
& n.216. 
170 These corporate speech protections are not without limit. Whereas courts apply 
strict scrutiny when reviewing burdens on corporate political speech, under the commercial 
speech doctrine, courts apply a lower standard, and states may regulate the content of 
commercial speech for truthfulness. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–66 (1980) (using a balancing test to determine 
restrictions on corporate commercial speech); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 776–786 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on corporate political 
speech). In addition, corporations have been long subject to mandatory silent periods and 
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political speech protections date back to the 1970s for corporations.171 The Court 
has also recognized that corporations have the right not to speak or be associated 
with speech of others.172 The Court’s mode of analysis has varied considerably, but 
in many cases, including most recently in Citizens United, the Court has relied on 
the idea that the First Amendment concerns the rights of listeners and the 
“marketplace of ideas” rather than the speaker’s identity.173 
While the Court has significantly expanded corporate rights, it has not 
grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood. For 
example, in the 1978 case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,174 one of the 
first Supreme Court cases to broadly protect corporate political spending as speech, 
the Court struck down a state law that prohibited corporations from spending 
money to influence the vote on referendum proposals having no material effect on 
the property, business, or assets of the corporation.175 The majority opinion by 
Justice Powell reframed the question answered by the courts below—whether 
corporations have or should have First Amendment rights coextensive with those 
of natural persons—to instead examine whether the statute “abridge[d] expression 
                                                 
compelled disclosures under federal securities laws that have been in effect since the 
1930s. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 93–106 (arguing that federal securities 
laws contain provisions in violation of the First Amendment); Adam Winkler, Corporate 
Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 871 (2007) 
(noting that if the Court were to recognize a broad corporate right to speak about matters of 
public concern then important federal securities laws would be in question). And, campaign 
finance laws continue to restrict direct corporate contributions for the election of 
candidates. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59–36, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (prohibiting 
corporate campaign contributions); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per 
curiam) (striking down Federal Election Campaign Act limits on candidate and 
independent campaign expenditures while upholding contribution limits, reasoning that the 
government’s interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process was adequate to justify only the latter). 
171 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
761–70 (1976); Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561–66 (commercial speech); Bellotti, 435 
U.S. at 776–86 (political speech). The Court had earlier held unconstitutional a state license 
tax imposed on newspaper corporations selling advertising space as an impermissible 
abridgment of the freedom of speech or speech of the press under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936). 
The Court relied on precedents holding that corporations are “persons” for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes and precedents holding that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards freedom of speech and of the press against abridgement 
by state legislation. Id. 
172 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 2 (1986) (holding 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment a state regulation allowing an advocacy group 
to enclose inserts in a public utility’s newsletter mailing). 
173 For a critique of the marketplace of ideas approach, see Tushnet, supra note 92, at 
253. For an argument that corporate personhood has played a smaller role in shaping 
corporate speech rights than some believe, see Winkler, supra note 170, at 863–68. 
174 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
175 Id. at 768. 
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that the First Amendment was meant to protect.”176 This is consistent with the 
language of the First Amendment, which is not framed as the grant of an individual 
right and does not refer to “persons.”177 
To answer this reframed question, the Court identified the case as concerning 
speech about a referendum issue, a type of political speech within the purview of 
the First Amendment, and then concluded that the statute was invalid under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments because it impinged this speech, regardless of 
the identity of the speaker.178 The Court based this decision on the idea that the 
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect a marketplace of ideas and that the 
source of the speech is not determinative.179 
However, the Court also invoked jurisprudence under the corporate 
personhood doctrine, noting that First Amendment freedom of speech is within the 
liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that “[i]t has been settled for almost a century that corporations are persons within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 180  The Court cited Santa Clara 
without explanation.181 
At this point, the Court’s analysis might arguably appear as a sleight of hand. 
The Court first stated that the question was not about the rights of corporations, but 
then pointed to corporations’ rights as persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.182 The Court relied on this Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to 
apply the First Amendment to the state action at issue in the case. 183  Citing 
precedent stating the corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not explain, however, the extent to which a 
corporation is protected in spending money to influence referenda not materially 
affecting the business of the corporation.184 To this extent, the Court’s analysis was 
both internally contradictory and substantively incoherent. 
Further, the Court left largely unexamined the various types and dynamics of 
corporations and their impact in considering whether the statute met the strict 
scrutiny standard.185  For example, in response to an argument that the statute 
served state interests in protecting shareholders against the use of corporate funds 
to support views they opposed, the Court stated: “Ultimately shareholders may 
                                                 
176 Id. at 775–76. 
177 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
178 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. 
179 See id. at 810 (White, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 778–80 & n.15 (citing Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 
(1886)). 
181 Id. at 780 & n.15. 
182 Id. at 778–80. 
183 See id. 
184 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 173 n.61 (noting that the characterization 
of the corporation as a “person” in Bellotti “does not help clarify the scope of constitutional 
protection of corporate political speech”). 
185 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789–95. 
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decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation 
should engage in debate on public issues.”186 This view ignores, however, that “the 
reality of the large corporation is far from democratic, because shareholders rarely 
have the incentive to exercise their legal rights.”187 Moreover, this view ignores the 
fact that the procedures of “corporate democracy” do not actually empower 
shareholders to control the corporation’s political spending in a meaningful way.188 
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, grappled with this 
modern corporate context in his dissent. Instead of unquestioning reliance on Santa 
Clara, Justice White argued that “an examination of the First Amendment values 
that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society 
it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications 
emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual 
expression is not.”189  According to Justice White, corporate speech should be 
protected when it furthers the shareholders’ self-expression, such as when 
corporations are formed to advance particular ideological causes shared by all 
members or press corporations formed to disseminate information and ideas.190 
For-profit corporations are not formed for achieving self-expression; 
“[s]hareholders in such entities do not share a common set of political or social 
views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of 
advancing political or social causes.” 191  That is, shareholders in for-profit 
corporations lack a common purpose with regard to what the legislation at issue in 
Bellotti prohibited—corporate spending to influence public opinion or votes on 
referenda having no material connection to the corporation’s business or property. 
Thus, in Justice White’s view, the majority failed to appreciate that the state’s 
decision in balancing competing First Amendment interests in the legislation 
relating to such corporate expenditures would pass “even the most exacting 
scrutiny.”192 
 
IV.  THE COURT’S FLAWED CONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
 
The notion of the corporate person in constitutional jurisprudence is rooted in 
concerns about protecting contracts and property, resembling the ethos of the legal 
                                                 
186 Id. at 794–95. 
187 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing the contractual theory of the 
corporation). 
188 Pollman, supra note 4, at 55–58. 
189 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. at 805. 
191  Id. Justice White concluded that the state had therefore struck a permissible 
balance between the First Amendment interests involved in the case. Id. at 821–22 (“The 
electoral process, of course, is the essence of our democracy. It is an arena in which the 
public interest in preventing corporate domination and the coerced support by shareholders 
of causes with which they disagree is at its strongest and any claim that corporate 
expenditures are integral to the economic functioning of the corporation is at its weakest.”). 
192 Id. at 804. 
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personality doctrine giving the corporation its ability to function as a separate legal 
unit.193 Key constitutional precedents like Dartmouth College and Santa Clara 
expressed the notion that real people exist behind the corporation and their 
property and contract interests should be protected, as they would have been if they 
had not acted through the corporate form.194 
Later taking an ad hoc approach to determining the scope of corporate rights, 
the Court expanded these rights by relying on the older cases, or assumptions 
stemming from them, without explaining their application in new contexts such as 
in criminal law and, at times, in First Amendment jurisprudence.195 
Although the three conceptions of corporate personality from the nineteenth 
century still find their way into opinions, they do not bolster the Court’s reasoning 
because each conception is flawed or incomplete and the Court’s variance with 
them only adds to the inconsistency of its approach. None of these conceptions 
fully explain why corporations should or should not receive constitutional rights 
and what the scope of those rights should be. It appears that not much has changed 
since John Dewey’s observation that “there is no clear-cut line, logical or practical, 
through the different theories which have been advanced . . . [e]ach theory has 
been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing 
ends.”196 The concession theory sometimes emerges when the Court, or a justice 
writing in dissent, is justifying a limitation on corporate power.197 A sign of this 
rhetorical move is a quote of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous characterization of 
                                                 
193 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 1640–41. 
194 See discussion supra Part II.B, D. 
195 See discussion supra Part III.A, D. 
196 Dewey, supra note 8, at 669. For example, while in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14, 
Justice Powell called the concession view “an extreme position [that] could not be 
reconciled with the many decisions . . . affording corporations the protection of 
constitutional guarantees,” he later used the view to justify the decision in CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). CTS concerned the constitutionality of a 
state anti-takeover regulation under the Commerce Clause. Justice Powell quoted Chief 
Justice Marshall’s famous characterization of the corporation as a state-created “artificial 
being”—the same view Justice Powell had previously called “extreme.” Compare id. at 89 
(quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638 (1819)), with 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14. 
197  See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) 
(“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to 
privacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon 
society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal 
Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from 
government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.”); Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 653, 660, 680 (1990), overruled by Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); CTS, 481 U.S. at 89 (“We think the Court of Appeals failed 
to appreciate the significance . . . of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is 
regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law. As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained: ‘A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law.’”). 
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the corporation as “an artificial being, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.”198 The Court sometimes invokes the aggregate and real 
entity views when justifying recognition of corporate power or protection, and 
sometimes when justifying the contrary position.199 
Regarding the substantive weaknesses of these views, the concession theory 
may still describe an important aspect of corporations, but it does not fully mesh 
with contemporary times; it envisions more state action and control than is the case 
when incorporating is a mere administrative formality. As incorporation is no 
longer a special grant there is also no longer any sense of an associated monopoly 
power. Arguably the only concessions from the state are limited liability and legal 
personality itself,200 which scholars have noted cannot be practicably achieved 
through contracting.201 However, many legal thinkers do not see this as enough 
justification for the state to retain a tight leash on corporations, or to explain our 
current jurisprudence that has moved beyond this view.202 Further, as corporations 
can change their place of incorporation, switching state or even country, the 
                                                 
198 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636; see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation in support of 
the idea that the Framers assumed corporations could be comprehensively regulated for 
public welfare and arguing that the majority’s rejection of restrictions on corporate political 
spending was a “radical departure from what had been settled First Amendment law”); 
CTS, 481 U.S. at 89 (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to support the 
constitutionality of a state regulation of corporate governance, specifically a state anti-
takeover statute); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77–79 (1906) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(quoting Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to argue that corporations should 
not receive Fourth Amendment protections); see also Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, 471 
F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to 
support enforcement of a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of live sex act businesses, 
against a challenge that the ordinance violated the corporation’s privacy rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
199 For example, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that the 
defendant corporation had a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search because 
“[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about 
his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.” 
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (quoting See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)). Seemingly, 
the Court was looking to people behind the corporation, per the aggregate theory, although 
it is not clear whether that was to the managers or shareholders. Compare this with the 
entity phrasing in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, in which the Court explained: 
“Plainly a business establishment or an industrial or commercial facility enjoys certain 
protections under the Fourth Amendment.” 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986). 
200 Perhaps one might expand upon this notion to add “perpetual life, separation of 
ownership and control, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of 
assets.” See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
201 See Hansmann & Kraakman, Organizational Law, supra note 57, at 390. 
202 See Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of 
the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), 
www.professorbainbridge.com (“It has been over half-a-century since corporate legal 
theory, of any political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously.”). 
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description of corporations as a concession from a particular state seems a poor fit 
in our modern, global environment.203 
The aggregate view offers the advantage of explaining why corporations 
should have constitutional protections because it recognizes that human actors 
exist behind the corporation. But like the concession view, the aggregate view can 
be incongruent with modern times, at least in the large company context where it is 
not clear whose rights are being protected and what the scope of those rights 
should be. In the case of a small, non-profit political advocacy corporation, for 
example, its members might be readily identifiable as pursuing shared goals. The 
shareholders in large publicly traded corporations, however, number in the 
thousands204 and are not a static set of identifiable human actors. They are often 
institutional, short-term investors, which change frequently and add layers of 
distance in terms of decision-making and monitoring from the humans who 
invested their capital.205 Shareholders may also come from outside of the United 
States.206 Shareholders do not control corporate decision-making in any real sense, 
nor is it necessarily desirable for them to do so. Indeed, the average investor may 
be rationally ignorant of the details of the corporation’s governance.207 Further, 
while shareholders may share an interest in the firm’s value, they may not share 
other social and political interests.208 
The real entity view perhaps meshes best with common conceptions about 
corporations. When people think of corporations they do not likely think of 
creatures of the state or of clusters of people. As a general matter, they likely think 
of corporations as different from human beings. They likely think of the large 
companies that are most salient in our daily lives. These corporations are neither 
individuals nor the government; they are in their own category. Further, the real 
entity view benefits from not being tied to an outdated view of the corporation as a 
state concession or as a group of shareholders to be protected. 
                                                 
203  See generally Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International 
Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 
(1998) (discussing arbitrage of securities laws and the increasingly globalized securities 
markets); Robert Reich, Who Is Us?, 32 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1990) (discussing the 
increasing globalization of American-owned corporations and foreign corporations’ 
employment of American workers). 
204 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 789, 792 (2007) (“It is difficult and expensive to arrange for thousands of dispersed 
shareholders to express their often-differing views on the best way to run the firm.”). 
205  See id. at 807; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751–53 (2006). 
206 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 999, 1031 (discussing how the debate about the nature of the corporation has 
reignited with the rise of multinationals and noting that “shareholders now tend to come 
from many countries”). 
207 See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6. 
208 See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the 
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2095–96 nn.126–30 
(2010) (discussing how shareholders’ interests diverge). 
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But this view does not illuminate why corporations would receive 
constitutional protections. That is, it does not follow ineluctably from looking at 
the corporation as a real entity, with unique organizational qualities, that it would 
have rights as a person. The Constitution does not mention corporations and we 
owe no allegiance to corporations as reified entities, without reference to the idea 
that people are involved. 
A fundamental problem thus exists with the traditional understanding of 
corporate personhood as a unified doctrine based on a conception of the 
corporation, and as covering the panoply of recognized corporate rights. If the 
Court has moved beyond thinking of corporations in terms of the concession 
theory and aggregate theory, then how do we understand continued reliance on the 
case law that is based on those views? As discussed above, the real entity theory 
was not a common view until after some of the key early precedents such as Santa 
Clara and so it is not a part of their reasoning.209 And, even the real entity theory is 
incomplete in that it fails to illuminate why the entity should receive constitutional 
protection as a person and what the scope of that protection should be. Besides the 
mere recognition that corporations may hold rights there is no conceptual core that 
ties together this doctrine. There has been no consistently used test or procedure 
for determining whether corporations should hold a certain right. 
 
V.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD DOCTRINE 
 
Tracing the evolving theories of corporate personality and the Court’s shifting 
approach shows the need to develop a better way to understand and explain the 
legal treatment of different kinds of associations of people, in particular the 
constitutional rights of public corporations dominating our culture and economy. 
That corporations have a “legal personality” allowing them to contract, own 
property, sue and be sued is not controversial. Nor should it be controversial—
these are essential features necessary for corporations’ practical use. This Article 
asserts that the roots of the corporate personhood doctrine are likewise akin to 
these essential features of legal personality. But there is a growing sense among the 
public, and perhaps on the Court, 210  that corporations no longer fit a person 
metaphor for purposes of expanding constitutional rights. 
                                                 
209 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
210 During re-argument in Citizens United, Justice Sotomayor questioned the Court’s 
personification of the corporation, perhaps rhetorically: 
 
Going back to the question of stare decisis, the one thing that is very 
interesting about this area of law for the last 100 years is the active involvement 
of both State and Federal legislatures in trying to find that balance between the 
interest of protecting in their views how the electoral process should proceed 
and the interests of the First Amendment. 
And so my question to you is, once we say they can’t, except on the basis 
of a compelling government interest narrowly tailored, are we cutting off or 
would we be cutting off that future democratic process? Because what you are 
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One measure of this is the remarkable public reaction to the recent Citizens 
United decision on corporate political speech. Public opinion polls by ABC News 
and the Washington Post found that 80% of Americans opposed the Court’s 
Citizens United ruling. 211  Anecdotally, a surprisingly large number of online 
newspaper articles and blogs covering the case that allow for public comment had 
posts rejecting the idea of corporations as persons.212 Reform organizations have 
proposed constitutional amendments to preclude corporations from claiming Bill 
of Rights protections. One such proposal would amend the Constitution to provide 
that “the U.S. Constitution protects only the rights of living human beings.”213 
The irony is that the notion of the corporate person was embraced to protect 
the rights of living human beings—to protect the property of individuals regardless 
of whether it is held in the corporate form. However, the public reaction to Citizens 
United shows that while some corporations can still be easily imagined as vehicles 
through which individuals pursue their goals, as with other organizations, it has 
become increasingly difficult to envision and identify real people behind large 
corporations whose diverse rights in various contexts should necessarily be 
protected in this form. This is particularly true when the right at issue does not 
clearly correspond to the business or economic realm for which shareholders are 
assumed to be acting when they invest in a business corporation. 
The importance of this task is not limited to a particular case, such as the 
recent controversial Citizens United decision. Even accepting that the First 
Amendment is a negative restriction on government, not tied to the identity of the 
                                                 
suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons, gave birth to 
corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that that was the 
Court’s error to start with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court 
imbued a creature of State law with human characteristics. 
 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-
205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
205[Reargued].pdf. Justice Sotomayor joined in Justice Stevens’ dissent. Citizens United v. 
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929–80 (2010). 
211 See Gary Langer, In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public 
Dissents, ABCNEWS.COM POLLS (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com 
/thenumbers/2010/02/in-supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-finance-the-public-dissents. 
html. The survey language for these polls left much to be desired in terms of precision, but 
the magnitude of public disapproval was notable. See Matt Sundquist, Imprecise Language 
and Citizens United Polling, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.scotus 
blog.com/2010/03/imprecise-language-and-citizens-united-polling/. 
212 E.g., Michael D. Shear, Obama Calls Citizens United Ruling a “Huge Blow”, 
WASH. POST (May 1, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/05/ 
obama-calls-citizens-united-ru.html (user comments). 
213 Proposed Constitutional Amendments, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG, http://reclaim 
democracy.org/political_reform/proposed_constitutional_amendments.html (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2011). 
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speaker, that corporate spending is speech, 214  and that disclosure rules could 
address other concerns—this does not tell us how to understand the new 
battlegrounds that are sure to come. How will the Court analyze the 
constitutionality of the responses to Citizens United? Further attacks on campaign 
finance laws such as direct campaign contribution limits?215 Disclosure rules?216 
How does this apply to unincorporated businesses and other types of 
organizations? Foreign nationals? 217  Long-standing federal securities laws? 218 
Furthermore, other areas such as privacy are developing that may test the 
understanding of corporate personality.219 If the Court continues its approach, the 
public will likely continue to view decisions that broaden corporate rights in a 
negative light. 
Substitute metaphors or concepts of the firm may provide a useful starting 
point for more analytical thinking about the legal treatment of modern 
corporations. These include the well-known nexus of contracts theory and the 
intelligent machine metaphor.220 However, a unifying metaphor or philosophical 
theory of the corporation is not needed for the functional analysis in which the 
Court should engage. Metaphors and theories of the corporation may in fact 
impede or muddy consideration of what is important for that functional analysis—
                                                 
214 For an argument that restrictions on giving and spending money do not constitute 
restrictions on speech, see Hellman, supra note 2, at 953–56; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning 
that ascribing business corporations the intellect and conscience for First Amendment self-
expression is “to confuse metaphor with reality”); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the 
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005, 1019 (1976) (arguing that 
“[m]oney . . . may be related to speech, but money itself is not speech” and “nothing in the 
First Amendment commits us to the dogma that money is speech”). 
215  See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010) 
(discussing the potential impact of Citizens United on campaign finance law, including 
corporate contributions). 
216 See Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer 
for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622 
(2010) (discussing the constitutionality of broad disclosure and disclaimer regulations after 
Citizens United). 
217 See Massaro, supra note 6, at 664–67. 
218 See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2011). 
219  For example, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether 
corporations have a constitutional right to privacy in recently holding that the “personal 
privacy” exemption under the Freedom of Information Act does not encompass 
corporations. FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1179 (2011) (noting the case “[did] not call 
for the Court to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of 
constitutional or common law”). 
220 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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real people and the implications for the proper scope of corporate rights.221 The 
following discussion explains the limits of substitutes to the corporate-person 
metaphor, and presents an alternative approach. 
 
A.  The Limits of a Substitute Metaphor 
 
1.  The Corporation as Contract 
 
The predominant metaphor in corporate law is not of the corporation as a 
person, but rather as a nexus of contracts. According to this view, the firm is the 
common party that contracts with all of the firm’s inputs and outputs. 222 
Corporations are “simply legal fictions that serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals.”223 
In The Corporation and The Constitution, Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein 
“articulate a contractual theory of the corporation that is based on the modern 
economics of the firm” and then “apply this theory to the interpretation of 
constitutional doctrine.” 224  They argue that constitutional treatment of the 
corporation should focus on the economic reality of the corporation, which is not 
an artificial government-created entity, but rather a set of contracts created through 
private ordering that should be protected from government interference.225 
They do not present the nexus of contracts concept as a metaphor for the 
corporation; they state that a corporation is in fact a set of contracts.226 Under this 
                                                 
221 See Robert Sapolsky, This is Your Brain on Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
(Nov. 14, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/this-is-your-
brain-on-metaphors/ (discussing, neurologically, how the brain handles metaphors). 
222  For foundational work on the economic concept of the firm as a “nexus of 
contracts,” see Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), and Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
223 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 222, at 310; see also Frank Easterbrook & Daniel 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (“More often than 
not a reference to the corporation as an entity will hide the essence of the transaction.”). 
224  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at viii; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995) (arguing 
that the “different theories of the corporation lead to different conclusions about the 
appropriate extent of corporate constitutional rights”). 
225 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at viii–ix, 143–144. 
226 E.g., id. at viii (“Contractarians view the corporation as a set of private contractual 
relationships among providers of capital and services.”); id. at 27 (“The book is based on 
two general principles. First, in deciding how to apply constitutional principles, the 
corporation should be viewed as a set of private contractual relationships subject to 
complex market forces. Second, an important implication of this is that corporations, like 
other contracts, must be protected from the acts of political agents and private parties who 
seek to circumvent contracts through the political process.”); id. at 143 (“[T]he corporation 
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notion, corporate contracts should be treated the same as other contracts under the 
Constitution.227 “[P]ersonal rights” should be applied to individuals rather than to 
the corporation. 228  Furthermore, “courts should take into account economic 
principles that relate to the particular context in which the Constitution is being 
applied.”229 This means that “courts should not necessarily apply constitutional 
provisions in the same way to all subjects,” and the authors give as an example that 
contractual choice of law should be the subject of a special theory of the 
Commerce Clause rather than having an “unmanageable ‘grand unified theory’ of 
the commerce clause.”230 
Importantly, Butler and Ribstein’s work draws attention to the need to update 
the constitutional treatment of corporations with the economic and business reality 
of the corporation. Their work makes a large contribution to a surprisingly 
undeveloped area. Their contractual theory approach is subject to several 
criticisms, however. 
First, the contract view has been characterized as simply a reinvention of the 
aggregate theory representing the opposite pole in a debate with the classic 
concession theory.231 This reinvention criticism fairly observes that the contract 
view aims to refute the concession theory. And in light of Part III.B’s discussion of 
the history of the corporate personhood debate, perhaps the contract theory should 
indeed be viewed with skepticism in the constitutional context, as other unified 
conceptions of the corporation have been called out as rhetorical devices to support 
their normative implications.232 However, the reinvention criticism notably does 
not consider possible differences between the contract view and aggregate view of 
the corporation that may be worth exploring. 
                                                 
is fundamentally a set of contracts . . . [and] the law should permit and enforce these 
contracts.”). 
227 Id. at 1; see also Ribstein, supra note 224, at 103 (“Thus, it does not follow either 
from potential externalities inherent in limited tort liability or from the filing prerequisite to 
obtaining limited liability that the corporation is not entitled to the same treatment under 
the Constitution as other contracts. The extent to which potential externalities justify 
regulation is a normative question.”). 
228 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 143–44. 
229 Id. at 144. 
230 Id. 
231 See, e.g., Stephen Bottomley, The Birds, the Beasts and the Bat: Developing a 
Constitutional Theory of Corporate Regulations, 27 FED. L. REV. 243, 255 (1999) (arguing 
for “corporation constitutionalism” in which both the concession and contract views are 
appreciated: “corporations are more than just artificially created legal institutions . . . and 
they are more than just economic institutions”); Bratton, Jr., supra note 74, at 1476–77 
(outlining two variants of the “new economic theory” that emerged in the 1970s, tracing 
their roots to neoclassical economics and institutional economics, respectively); Millon, 
supra note 71, at 203 (arguing “the private aggregation idea has assumed the garb of 
neoclassical economics under the ‘corporation as a nexus of contracts’ rubric”). 
232 See Dewey, supra note 8. 
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Second, the nexus of contracts theory for corporate personality has been 
criticized as lacking clear boundaries to define the relevant group.233 For example, 
Daniel Greenwood has argued in the context of the First Amendment that 
corporations are illegitimate political speakers because, amongst other reasons, 
they lack mechanisms to ensure that corporate actions are representative of the 
people involved.234 According to Greenwood, 
 
If employees, bondholders, customers, neighbors or other stakeholders 
are considered part of the corporation, or if the corporation is seen not as 
the shareholders joined together but as a nexus of contracts in which 
employees can be thought of as hiring capital just as easily as the other 
way around, then the boundaries of the corporation are no longer clear.235  
 
Greenwood maintains that this problem is significant because group boundaries 
profoundly affect the legitimacy of actions on the group’s behalf.236 
Third, Butler and Ribstein rely on the idea that “it follows . . . from the fact 
that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than a creature of state law, that 
personal rights in the Constitution should be applied to individuals connected with 
the firm rather than to the firm itself,” but do not provide a way to know when a 
right qualifies as personal.237 This is a different sort of line-drawing issue than the 
boundary problem noted above. 
The Court itself has used this phrasing, stating that “[c]ertain ‘purely 
personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other organizations 
because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the 
protection of individuals.”238 Whether a right is personal “depends on [its] nature, 
history, and purpose.”239 The quintessential example of a right the Supreme Court 
has deemed “purely personal” is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.240 But Butler and Ribstein do not seem to be relying on the Court’s 
                                                 
233 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 995, 1030–31 (1998). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1031. 
236 Id. at 1022, 1031. 
237 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 143–44 (“Our theory of the Constitution and 
the corporation has implications for other constitutional provisions that we do not discuss. 
It follows, for example, from the fact that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than 
a creature of state law, that personal rights in the Constitution should be applied to 
individuals connected with the firm rather than to the firm itself. Thus, just as the state-
creation theory and personification of the corporation should not play any role in the 
determination of corporations’ rights under the First Amendment, contract clause, or 
commerce clause, so they should not determine the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the corporate context or entitle foreign corporations to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens.”). 
238 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14. 
239 Id. 
240 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698, 700 (1944). 
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analysis for what would be “personal,” as they give as an example that it was 
“clearly wrong for the Court to deny a sole owner or shareholder the Fifth 
Amendment privilege of not being forced to incriminate himself by producing 
business documents, merely because he had incorporated the business.”241 
Accordingly, as the authors do not make clear how to tell what is a “personal 
right in the Constitution,” their view does not elucidate which rights corporations 
should have and how to determine this. Their work aims to refute the concession 
view of the corporation, but does not, and perhaps did not intend to, provide an 
overarching way of understanding how the Constitution applies to the corporation. 
Finally, in the context of corporate governance, some scholars have tried to 
reconcile theories about whether the corporation should be accountable to 
shareholders or a larger group of stakeholders or society. They have done so by 
arguing that regardless of whether corporations are viewed as concessions or 
contracts, they should be regulated when it is in the public interest to do so.242 This 
point applies equally well in the corporate personhood context; indeed, it evokes 
John Dewey’s argument for analysis without regard to the idea of personality. 
Labels for the corporation do not have to be agreed upon in order to understand the 
purpose of a constitutional protection and whether according it to corporations 
would serve its intended purpose. 
 
2.  The Corporation as an Intelligent Machine 
 
Another alternative metaphor for the corporation is Meir Dan-Cohen’s idea of 
the corporation as an “intelligent machine.”243 This metaphor likens a corporation 
to a business run entirely by computers without human involvement. Dan-Cohen 
offers the metaphor in story format to encourage reflection on what features of the 
organization should matter for its legal treatment. In the first stage of the story, an 
entrepreneur and a few individuals go into business, decide to incorporate and 
within a few years go public and grow to a large corporation. 244  Next, the 
corporation purchases its entire outstanding stock and completely automates with 
computers its operations, management, and decision-making processes.245 At this 
point, the corporation is like an intelligent machine. There are no human beings 
involved with the corporation and Dan-Cohen posits that the legal treatment of the 
corporation would not significantly change.246 In the final stage, the corporation 
                                                 
241 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 144 (citing Braswell v. United States, 487 
U.S. 99 (1988)). 
242 Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 57, at 441 n.5 (2001) 
(arguing the contract view, which champions shareholder primacy, is effectively “an 
assertion that social welfare is best served by encouraging corporate managers to pursue 
shareholder interests”). 
243 DAN-COHEN, supra note 136, at 41–51. 
244 Id. at 46. 
245 Id. at 47. 
246 Id. at 47–48. 
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confronts economic difficulties that trigger the computers to sell stock to outsiders 
and the new shareholders reinstate human managers who hire employees again.247 
The intelligent machine metaphor is a thought experiment about the legal 
treatment of corporations. It evokes John Dewey’s view that using the word 
“person” to refer to a corporation could have meant simply that it is a legal unit 
that bears whatever rights and duties it is assigned.248 It would be a person for 
some purposes, but not for others. Unlike the person metaphor, however, which 
poses a danger of implicit assumptions because we already have a set of laws that 
apply to individuals, the intelligent machine metaphor does not carry its own 
consequences. And, even if the intelligent machine metaphor seems implausible 
because it contemplates a corporation without human involvement, 249  it 
nonetheless serves the purpose of forcing consideration of which groups of persons 
should matter for a particular legal treatment of corporations and what their 
relationships must be like to justify this treatment. For example, why should a 
corporation have double jeopardy protection but not the privilege against self-
incrimination?  
In sum, the contractual theory and the intelligent machine metaphor imply 
that there are weaknesses in the way the Court has applied the Constitution to the 
corporation. But they also highlight that a different theory or metaphor for the 
corporation may be unnecessary. The response to the contractual theory—that 
regardless of whether corporations are viewed as concessions or contracts they 
should be regulated when in the public interest to do so—brings us essentially back 
to where the corporate personality debate ended in the 1930s.250 And a sensible 
view of the intelligent machine metaphor may be that it simply captures the 
problem of finding a rationale for protecting corporations when it is not clear what 
human interests would justify it. It does not itself explain how to apply the 
Constitution to the corporation. 
 
B.  An Alternative Approach 
 
As this Article has shown, the roots of the corporate personhood doctrine are 
based in concerns about the property and contract interests of shareholders, but 
beyond these roots the doctrine is not unified in topic or in approach. This lack of 
coherence means that the corporate personhood doctrine stands for little more than 
the mere recognition that corporations can hold rights. The Court should not rely 
on corporate personhood cases created in different contexts—concerning different 
rights and with changing conceptions of the corporation—as rationale for 
                                                 
247 Id. at 49. 
248 Dewey, supra note 8, at 656. 
249 Daniel Greenwood provides another way of thinking about this with his argument 
that corporate law excludes actual shareholders from participation and instead uses the idea 
of “a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations, economic incentives or 
political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular 
corporation.” See Greenwood, supra note 233, at 1033–34. 
250 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
2011] RECONCEIVING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 1671 
 
expanding or contracting the scope of corporate constitutional rights. This would 
only exacerbate the incoherence in the case law and raise concerns about the 
Court’s legitimacy and transparency. Viewed properly, the doctrine of corporate 
personhood is only a starting point for analysis of whether corporations should 
hold a particular right at issue. 
Furthermore, the Court does not have to substitute a different view or 
metaphor for the corporation in its analysis. As Dewey observed, although perhaps 
underestimating the lasting power and influence of words,251 retaining the word 
“person” will “do no great harm” once “concrete facts and relations involved have 
been faced and stated on their account.”252 
The goal should be to accord constitutional protections to corporations when 
it promotes the objectives of those protections. This premise is consistent with the 
early corporate personhood jurisprudence such as Dartmouth College insofar as the 
Court treated the corporate charter as a contract warranting Contracts Clause 
protection just like any other contract.253 The same concept applies to due process 
protection for corporate property. Although shareholders do not have direct control 
over the corporation’s property, the objective of protecting property from 
government interference is served by protecting corporate property like other 
property because individuals still ultimately hold rights with economic value 
related to that property. At least as a starting point of analysis, this Article 
maintains that, as a general matter, people should not give up constitutional 
protections by virtue of acting through a corporation. 
Moving beyond this premise, there may be reasons to deny corporations some 
protections or to find that their scope is limited. The objectives of the right at issue 
may not be served by according it to all corporations. 
For example, the Supreme Court may have correctly denied the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to corporations, or to most 
corporations. The privilege’s objective is often described as protecting against the 
“cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” 254  The Court has 
explained that its purpose is to protect, among other things, a fair individual-state 
balance, an “accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of criminal justice,” and 
“respect for the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life.”255 It may indeed be the case that, in 
                                                 
251 For a discussion of cognitive metaphor theory and the relationship between words 
and metaphoric ideas, see Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? 
How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 (2004). For a discussion of the complex relationship 
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252 Dewey, supra note 8, at 672–73. 
253 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
254 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
255  Id. Of course, as discussed below, over time the Court typically varies in 
descriptions of objectives and historical purpose. For a discussion and critique of various 
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most circumstances, it is not necessary to accord the privilege to a corporation in 
order to protect against the “cruel trilemma.” Notably, the Court has failed to 
explain why that is the case, however, and why this would hold in all cases 
involving corporations.256 
Promulgating all of the consequences of corporate rights using this pragmatic 
approach is outside the scope of this Article. However, the question remains 
whether the approach is workable. There are multiple pitfalls. 
One difficulty in achieving predictability and coherence with this approach 
may be that the objectives of the constitutional rights at issue are subject to 
multiple interpretations. And, with changing views about the purposes of the First 
Amendment, for example, it is likely there would be changing views about whether 
protecting corporate “speech” serves those purposes.257 Likewise, how broadly or 
narrowly the purposes of an amendment are construed could have a large impact 
on the result. This would likely be the case with Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
that has long proven controversial. 
Another difficulty is in identifying who is being protected when corporations 
are granted certain rights. This has been a persistent problem in the case law, 
particularly with the rise of the modern business corporation. It probably explains, 
at least in part, why the connection between protecting corporations and protecting 
people has been seemingly lost to the public. Older cases relying on concession or 
aggregate views of the corporation tend to identify, implicitly or explicitly, the 
people behind the corporation as the shareholders. Because the real entity view 
tends to reify the corporation, it obscures the connection to people. For the reasons 
explained in Part IV, none of these conceptions of the corporation provide a 
workable answer. 
Identifying who is at the core of the corporation has been the subject of heated 
debate in corporate law for decades. While most scholars would probably agree 
that shareholders are not really “owners” in the traditional sense,258 the question of 
                                                 
Fifth Amendment justifications, see Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 731–33 (2008). 
256  See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70 (1906) (conclusorily stating that 
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personal privilege of the witness” and any human to speak for the corporation is an agent, 
who does not speak for “himself”). 
257 For a discussion of different views of the First Amendment, see Sullivan, supra 
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Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 260–61 
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Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (noting that 
shareholders are not owners under the nexus of contracts theory); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
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where the locus of corporate power resides or should reside—in directors or 
shareholders or a broader group of stakeholders—is unresolved.259 This Article’s 
approach does not purport to resolve the question for purposes of corporate law; 
rather it identifies this as an area for further development in the literature about 
corporate rights. 
For purposes of rights analysis, it may make sense to continue viewing 
shareholders as the subjects of protections that primarily serve property and 
contract interests. Although shareholders are not exactly “owners” of the corporate 
property, some stability in the corporation as a separate entity that can hold locked-
in capital free from government takings and disruption to corporate charters is 
necessary for an investment environment. Recent scholarship on the doctrine of 
legal personality has shown this with respect to the essential functions of the 
corporation.260 To wit, this stability also protects the executives, directors, and 
other employees, who invest human capital in the corporation, although that may 
not be considered a property or contract interest. 
For rights stemming from corporate criminal liability, the question is much 
harder. More than a century after New York Central, there is still debate about 
whether corporations should even be subject to corporate criminal liability.261 
Assuming the premise of corporate criminal liability, the question arises whether 
corporations hold rights related to searches and trials because these are simply 
system features or if it is to protect shareholders or employees or some other 
individuals behind the corporation. To say, as the Court has in the Fourth 
Amendment context, that a corporation is “but an association of individuals under 
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity” or that “corporations are a 
necessary feature of modern business”262 does not explain whether it serves the 
purposes of the right at issue, nor does it explain whose interests would be 
                                                 
shareholders are not owners—that their share ownership gives them no right to claim or 
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protected. If Fourth Amendment protection of corporations is for shareholders’ 
benefit, then the right must be, at least in a sense, to protect their property or 
economic investment since that is generally the nature of shareholders’ relation to 
the business corporation. If it is for employees’ benefit, one is left to wonder how 
it actually serves them, since the employee retains his or her own rights as to 
prosecutions in an individual capacity. The difficulty of making sense of which 
persons behind the corporation are being protected by the Fourth Amendment, and 
other rights related to searches and trials, suggests that inadequate attention has 
been paid to this question. This deserves greater examination in future challenges 
to the scope of these rights, as well as related rights like privacy. 
For rights regarding corporate speech, as illustrated above with explanation of 
the Bellotti dissent,263 the limited control of shareholders in corporate affairs and 
their typically heterogeneous social and political interests may factor into analysis 
of the constitutionality of campaign finance legislation.264 In particular, it may 
factor into analysis of whether a particular regulation meets the applicable standard 
of scrutiny. Although it did not win the day, the reasoning in the Bellotti dissent 
came much closer to an internally consistent explanation that takes account of the 
corporate context and the dynamics of the people underlying corporations. Citizens 
United failed in that regard, refusing to consider who actually speaks through 
corporate spending and relying on Bellotti’s flawed admonition that any abuses 
could be corrected “by shareholders through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.”265 
Finally, while the focus in this Article has been on large business 
corporations, there are persistent challenges in considering the rights of different 
types of business associations—for example, partnerships, limited liability 
companies, as well as different types of corporations, like non-profit corporations 
and closely held corporations. Between these different types of associations, the 
dynamics of the people underlying the entity differ as does the purpose of the 
entity. This adds a wrinkle of complexity in determining whether it furthers the 
objective of a particular right to provide it to all business associations or all 
corporations. Drawing meaningful lines between them also poses challenges.266 In 
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the context of speech, the treatment of media corporations is often raised as 
rationale against regulating for-profit corporations. 
Despite these difficulties, the approach proposed in this Article at least forces 
the identification of people whose rights are being protected through the corporate 
form. It may be an exceedingly difficult task, and empirical study of the impact on 
different groups of people from granting corporations rights would be helpful. 
Where the task proves too difficult and there is uncertainty regarding whether the 
objective of the right is being carried out, perhaps the answer is that in those 
instances the corporation should not be accorded such right, or should hold only a 
limited right. 
In addition, a major benefit of the approach would be at least using a 
consistent method rather than an ad hoc one that has meant that sometimes the 
Court has accorded a right to corporations without explanation or with oscillating 
conceptions of the corporation. A consistent test would bolster the transparency of 
the Court’s decision-making and its institutional legitimacy in this controversial 
area of the law. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing on the relevant historical, theoretical, and doctrinal background, this 
Article demonstrates that the doctrine of corporate personhood should not be 
understood as a justification or methodology for granting corporations any 
particular right. Instead, the doctrine merely recognizes that corporations can hold 
rights as a means of protecting the rights of humans involved in them. This is an 
important principle, but a distinctly limited one. It recognizes that corporations are 
human endeavors capable of holding rights, but does not explain which rights they 
have or how to make this determination. 
In addition, the Article proposes that courts should use a pragmatic approach 
for determining the scope of corporate rights rather than current ad hoc 
approaches. Courts should grant corporations a particular constitutional right only 
when doing so would serve the purpose of that right. Courts do not have to use a 
substitute metaphor or unifying view of the corporation for a functional analysis 
that considers the rights at stake and the people involved. Indeed, this Article has 
offered a critical view of the Supreme Court’s conceptions of the corporation and 
the use of metaphors in corporate rights determinations. These insights may add an 
important dimension to ongoing discussions about constitutional rights in the 
context of corporations and contribute to a theoretical framework for better 
understanding the constitutional treatment of corporations. 
                                                 
anti-distortion rationale on the basis that it could be used to ban the political speech of 
media corporations. Id. at 905–06. 
